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Executive Summary
Foundations increasingly seek to make investments in alignment 
with their charitable missions. Such “mission investments” have 
grown at an annualized rate of more than sixteen percent over 
the last fi ve years.1 Confusion remains, however, about the 
extent to which the relevant laws permit directors or trustees of 
a foundation to consider mission-related factors, in addition to 
risk and fi nancial return, when making investment decisions. 
This paper analyzes the legal considerations applicable to private 
and community foundations under federal and state laws. 
We conclude that foundations have considerable latitude to 
make investments that further their charitable missions, even if 
this results in greater risk or lower fi nancial returns.2 
Broadly speaking, foundations that wish to use their investments to further 
charitable objectives can do so in three ways, which together we refer to as 
“mission investing”:
 • Screening: Foundations can impose positive as well as negative  
  screens on their investment portfolios to screen in or out securities  
  in alignment with the charitable mission of the foundation. 
 • Proactive Investments: Foundations can also make specifi c
  mission-related investments (“MRI”) or program-related 
  investments (“PRI”) in nonprofi t or for-profi t organizations 
  that advance the charitable missions of the investing foundation.
  • Shareholder Advocacy and Proxy Voting: Foundations   
  can use their investments as a means to engage in shareholder
   advocacy through dialogue with corporate management, 
  shareholder resolutions, and proxy voting to infl uence a   
  corporation’s behavior on issues relevant to the foundation’s 
  mission.
In each case, the consideration of mission-related factors, or the added 
expenses of screening and shareholder advocacy, may reduce the 
foundation’s fi nancial returns below those it might have earned had it 
ignored such criteria in its investment decisions. The question arises, 
therefore, whether the law permits the foundation to accept lower fi nancial 
returns out of deference to its mission. 
When making investment decisions, whether about conventional investments 
or the mission investments described above, foundation trustees and 
directors must consider the donor’s intent, as well as federal tax laws 
and state fi duciary laws.3 These laws independently and as a whole allow 
1 SARAH COOCH & MARK KRAMER, FSG SOCIAL IMPACT ADVISORS, COMPOUNDING IMPACT:  
 MISSION INVESTING BY U.S. FOUNDATIONS (2007), available at: 
 http://www.fsg-impact.org/app/content/ideas/item/Compounding_Impact.html.
2 Each foundation should consult its own legal counsel and should not rely on this memo as legal 
 authority about any specifi c transaction.
3 Foundations are generally subject to the laws of the state where the corporation or trust was
 established. If  the foundation has principal offi ces or substantial activities in a different state, that
 state’s laws may also apply.
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broad discretion in the management of foundation assets. The law does 
not require a foundation director or trustee to achieve the maximum 
risk-adjusted return on foundation investments without regard to social 
considerations that might advance the foundation’s mission, even in a 
case in which the permanent existence of the foundation is protected as 
an endowment. Rather, the law requires a fi duciary to invest to ensure the 
capacity of the foundation to fulfi ll its charitable purposes in the short 
and long term. So long as prudence is exercised and due care is taken 
in making investment decisions, the social impact of an investment on a 
foundation’s charitable purpose may be weighed by a fi duciary.
Donor Intent
State laws of fi duciary duty give primacy to donor intent over other 
considerations, while the relevant federal tax law refers to fulfi llment of 
the foundation’s charitable purposes. Therefore, if a donor has indicated 
in writing that mission related factors may be considered in investment 
decisions, or that the foundation’s assets need not be preserved as a long-
term endowment, neither the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) nor state 
law will limit the ability of trustees or directors to make investments for 
mission-related objectives, even at a sacrifi ce of fi nancial return or increase 
in risk.4 Note, however, that language related to mission investing is still 
rare in most foundation documents; in many states the donor will be 
presumed to have intended to create a permanent endowment unless it was 
explicitly stated otherwise. In such cases, the law requires that the assets be 
managed to ensure the foundation’s perpetual existence, and a sacrifi ce of 
fi nancial performance in favor of charitable mission may be made only with 
consideration for the whole portfolio. 
4 The provisions of the I.R.C. that might limit a mission investment made with a donor’s blessing include:
 • If  the investment is deemed to be so risky as to jeopardize the capacity of  the foundation to fulfi ll its  
  charitable purposes in the long- or short-term. I.R.C. § 4944.
 • If  the investment constitutes “excess holdings” by controlling more than twenty percent of  the voting
  stock of a company (qualifying program-related investments excepted). I.R.C. § 4943.
 • If  the investment generates unrelated business income tax because it is unrelated to the
  foundation’s mission. I.R.C. § 511.
 • If  the investment funds lobbying activities. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
 • If  the investment constitutes self-dealing by conferring an economic benefi t on the donor, trustees,
  directors, or other “disqualifi ed persons” as defi ned by I.R.C. § 4941.
5 I.R.C. § 4944.
6 I.R.C. § 4944(c).
Relevant Federal Tax Law
Federal tax laws clearly permit mission investing by U.S. foundations. 
Certain federal tax restrictions, such as prohibitions on self-dealing and 
lobbying, apply to all private foundation activities, including investments. 
In addition, the law prohibits a private foundation from making an 
investment that jeopardizes a foundation’s ability in both the short and 
long term to fulfi ll its charitable purposes (a “jeopardy investment”).5 
The regulations interpreting this prohibition track the prudent investor 
standard, which explicitly takes into account the charitable purposes of 
the foundation. A mission investment by defi nition seeks to advance the 
charitable purposes of a foundation, but of course, must be considered 
within the total portfolio of the foundation. An exception to the jeopardy 
investment prohibition permits “program-related investments” (“PRIs”) 
which must be made primarily to advance the charitable purposes of the 
foundation, and may not be made with profi t as a signifi cant motive in the 
investment decision.6Although foundations often interpret this to require 
that PRIs earn little or no fi nancial return, I.R.S. private letter rulings make 
clear that even market rate returns may be permissible as long as there is 
at least one term of the investment that a profi t-seeking investor would not 
have accepted. 
Community foundations, by contrast, are not subject to the federal tax 
prohibitions against self-dealing, excess business holdings, or jeopardy 
investments. (They are, of course, subject to the federal law prohibitions 
applicable to charitable institutions, such as the restriction on private 
inurement and excess benefi ts.) As a result, the analysis of federal tax law 
relevant to mission investing focuses on the rules applicable to private 
foundations, and not to community foundations. State fi duciary laws, 
however, apply to private and community foundations alike.
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State Fiduciary Laws
With respect to state fi duciary law, the Uniform Prudent Management of 
Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”)7, which supersedes the Uniform Management 
of Institutional Funds Act (“UMIFA”),8 adopts the prudent investor rule for 
nonprofi t corporations that the Uniform Prudent Investors Act (“UPIA”)9 applies 
to trusts.10 This rule allows a fi duciary to consider the charitable purposes of the 
institution in managing its assets.11 
If a foundation’s assets were donated with the intention of establishing a permanent 
endowment, then UPMIFA requires that those assets be managed to maintain the 
value of the assets over time, while generating adequate investment returns to meet 
annual payout requirements. By contrast, the older uniform act, UMIFA, requires 
only that the historic dollar value of the assets be preserved, while generating 
adequate income for minimum payout requirements. UPIA imposes a prudent 
investor standard on trusts and prohibits investment in “socially responsible 
investments” if they involve a sacrifi ce of performance such that the interests of the 
trust’s benefi ciaries are compromised (a duty of loyalty standard). These interests 
have been correctly interpreted as purely fi nancial in nature when applied to a 
private trust for the benefi t of individuals. However, in the case of a charitable 
trust, a sacrifi ce of fi nancial performance in furtherance of the charitable purposes 
of the foundation should not give rise to a confl ict between the trust’s benefi ciaries 
(those benefi ting from its charitable work) and the mission investment. As a result, 
investments that further the charitable interests of a charitable trust do not per se 
violate the duty of loyalty and are permissible under state fi duciary laws. 
Our analysis concludes that these uniform laws do not require a fi duciary to 
maximize fi nancial performance, even if the foundation’s assets constitute a 
permanent “endowment” as legally defi ned (although in this case, care must 
be taken to manage the assets in such a way as to ensure that the assets of the 
foundation are not eroded over time). As a result, a foundation may invest to 
advance its mission even if this strategy results in inferior investment returns. 
The latitude that fi duciaries often assume they possess to spend down a 
foundation’s assets in advancement of its charitable purposes can be legally 
supported, unless the foundation is deemed an endowment.
Conclusion
If a foundation engages in a careful investment process to make investments 
that do not aim purely to maximize returns, but to optimize returns while 
serving the social mission of the foundation, a violation of the jeopardy 
investment rule or the relevant uniform statute is unlikely to occur. More 
specifi cally, mission-related investments that are reasonably expected to 
produce market rate investment returns, or at least returns at above infl ation 
plus payout, are permissible under the law. And mission investments that are 
below market rate are permissible so long as either (1) their fi nancial impact 
on the overall portfolio is expected to be mitigated by higher performing 
investments, such that the long-term value of foundation assets is not 
compromised, or (2) that investment qualifi es as a PRI. If a foundation’s assets 
are managed to accommodate both payout and infl ation year to year, and 
perform no better or worse than to meet these objectives, we conclude that the 
requirements of federal tax law and the relevant state laws will be met. 
It is important to point out that an inherent trade-off between fi nancial 
and social returns can no longer be assumed, thanks to the development 
of investment opportunities that deliver market-rate fi nancial returns while 
incorporating pro-active environmental, social, or governance screens.12 In 
fact, considerable evidence has accumulated that taking environmental and 
social considerations into account may actually increase investment returns.13 
Equally important, mission-related investment strategies are increasingly 
available that deliver market rates of return, as benchmarked against their 
respective asset classes.14 But even in the case of such a trade-off, we 
conclude that in the case of foundation assets, some sacrifi ce of fi nancial 
performance in favor of social impact is permissible under the law, so long as 
due care is exercised throughout the investment process.15
12 This trade-off  has historically been the most often voiced objection to the “prudence” of mission
  investing. See generally John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of
  Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980). 
13 See generally ABBY JOSEPH COHEN & MICHAEL MORAN, THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC.,
  PORTFOLIO STRATEGY UNITED STATES (2006), available at:
  http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/environment-and-energy/port-strat-growing-interest-pdf.pdf;
  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME FINANCE INITIATIVE WORKING GROUP, SHOW ME THE MONEY:  
  LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES TO COMPANY VALUE (2006). 
14 See, e.g., F.B. HERON FOUND., NEW FRONTIERS IN MISSION-RELATED INVESTING (2003),
  available at: http://www.fbheron.org/documents/ar.2003.viewbook_new_frontiers.pdf; 
  INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, BOSTON COLLEGE CENTER FOR CORPORATE
  CITIZENSHIP, HANDBOOK ON RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT ACROSS ASSET CLASSES (2007).
15 This interpretation does not apply to the investment of  the corpus of a personal trust or to the
  investment of  pension plans.
7 Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”)(2006). For the full text of  UPMIFA,  
  see http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/umoifa/2006annualmeeting_approvedtext.htm.
8 Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UMIFA”)(1972). For the full text of  UMIFA, see
 http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1970s/umifa72.pdf. 
9 Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”) (1994). For the full text of  UPIA, see 
 http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upia94.pdf.
10 UPIA § 2(a).
11 UPMIFA § 3(a). 
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Introduction
The growing interest among U.S. foundations in mission 
investing — the practice of using a foundation’s investments to 
further or align with its charitable purposes — has prompted 
greater attention to the complexities a foundation must navigate 
in considering and implementing a mission-investing program. 
Several helpful reports have been produced recently that provide 
guidance to foundation staff and trustees seeking to determine 
whether, and how, to engage in mission investing.16 This report 
seeks to fi ll a gap in the growing literature by clarifying the legal 
parameters surrounding the investment of a foundation’s assets 
in accordance with the charitable mission of the foundation.
In our past research on mission investing17 and through our own 
experience in advising foundations, we have discovered an array 
of opinions concerning whether tax and fi duciary laws permit, 
prohibit or are neutral about mission investing. Ambiguities in 
the relevant laws trigger confusion and the need for clarifi cation. 
This report provides a tool to foundation staff, trustees and their 
counsel to navigate the law relevant to mission investing by setting 
out clearly the substance of relevant laws and regulations, how 
they have been interpreted by legal authorities and practitioners, 
and how a foundation might best address the legal complexities of 
mission investing. 
How do we defi ne “mission investing”?
Broadly speaking, foundations that wish to use their investments to further 
charitable objectives can do so in three ways, which together we refer to as 
“mission investing:”
 • Screening: Foundations can screen their investment portfolios to
  invest in companies the activities of which advance the charitable
  mission of the foundation (such as investment in alternative   
  energy companies by a foundation focused on protecting the
  environment). Foundations may also impose negative screens to
  avoid investing in companies engaged in activities that may
  confl ict with their missions (such as investment in tobacco
  companies by a foundation focused on improving health outcomes).
 • Proactive Investments: Foundations can also make specifi c
  investments in nonprofi t or for-profi t organizations that provide
  mission-related products and services, such as making loans to
  their grantees, investments in affordable housing, or the
  development of therapeutic drugs. These investments, sometimes
  referred to as “mission-related investments,” may offer either
  below-market or market-rate fi nancial returns. In the case of
  private foundations, many of these investments may qualify as
  “program-related investments” under federal tax law (discussed  
  below in more detail).
 • Shareholder Advocacy and Proxy Voting: Foundations 
  can use their investments as a means to engage in shareholder
  advocacy through dialogue with corporate management,
   shareholder resolutions, and proxy voting to infl uence a
  corporation’s behavior on issues relevant to the foundation’s
  mission.
16 See, e.g., INST. FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, supra note 14; STEVEN GODEKE & DOUG   
  BAUER, ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY ADVISORS, PHILANTHROPY’S NEW PASSING GEAR:
  MISSION-RELATED INVESTING: A POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR FOUNDATION
  TRUSTEES (2008), available at http://rockpa.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/MRI.pdf; KYLE
  JOHNSON, CAMBRIDGE ASSOCIATES, SOCIAL INVESTING (2007).
17 SARAH COOCH & MARK KRAMER, supra note 1; MARK KRAMER & SARAH COOCH, FSG SOCIAL 
  IMPACT ADVISORS, AGGREGATING IMPACT: A FUNDER’S GUIDE TO MISSION INVESTMENT
  INTERMEDIARIES (2007), available at http://www.fsg-impact.org/app/content/ideas/item/545.
12 © 2008 FSG Social Impact Advisors INTRODUCTION 13
18 See, e.g., GOLDMAN SACHS, GS SUSTAIN (2007) (documenting that companies with better
  performance on environmental, social and governance criteria outperformed the world market index),
  available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/gs_esg_embargoed_until030707pdf.pdf; 
  Generation Investment Management, an investment fund established by Al Gore and former Goldman
  Sachs investor David Blood that aims to provide superior long term returns through including an analysis
  of  sustainability practices in the investment process, http://www.generationim.com; F.B. Heron Foundation,
  which invests roughly one-quarter of  its assets in a diverse portfolio of  mission investments and tracks
  their performance against conventional benchmarks for each asset class, http://www.fbheron.org.
19  Developed by Harry Markowitz, and published in his seminal article, Portfolio Selection, in the Journal 
  of  Finance in 1952, “modern portfolio theory” is one of the most infl uential economic theories relevant
   to fi nance and investment. The theory espouses the diversifi cation of portfolio assets as a means  
  of  reducing risk. The expected risk and return of any one stock is irrelevant to the theory. Rather, the  
  riskiness of the portfolio as a whole must be assessed. For a seminal study of the prudent man rule  
  and a call for its modernization, see BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT  
  AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE (1986). 
20 See infra Part I.B.1. 
Many foundation boards make investment decisions with a single objective 
in mind: to maximize fi nancial returns within prudent levels of risk. This is 
assumed to be consistent with the intent of the donor, and both federal tax 
laws and various state laws include provisions to require the foundation 
board to ensure that a foundation will be able to fulfi ll its charitable 
purposes on a permanent basis. When making mission investments, 
however, the foundation board adds a third consideration to the traditional 
risk and return analysis by weighing any number of environmental, social, 
or governance (“ESG”) factors that go beyond the traditional investment 
analysis. If these additional constraints lead to sub-optimal investment 
returns, then they may confl ict with the expectation of maximizing returns 
and raise the question as to whether they are prudent and therefore within 
the fi duciary duties imposed on foundation boards by the law.
Notably, the question of whether taking ESG factors into account lowers 
fi nancial returns is increasingly subject to debate. One traditional school 
of thought suggests that any consideration of non-fi nancial factors or 
any narrowing of the universe of potential investments through screening 
necessarily results in sub-optimal returns. On the other hand, Goldman 
Sachs, Innovest, and a number of investment funds have demonstrated 
in recent years that portfolios composed of companies that perform best 
on ESG measures tend to outperform world market indices.18 Depending 
on the way in which a foundation employs mission investments, we fi nd 
numerous examples of investments that perform at or above market rate 
and many others that perform below market rate. We therefore consider 
the legal issues from both perspectives, without attempting to resolve the 
economic debate.
As defi ned in both federal and state laws, the modern prudent investor 
rule governs fi duciary responsibility with respect to the management of a 
foundation’s investment assets. This rule calls upon the fi duciary to invest in 
accordance with modern portfolio theory, which requires the diversifi cation 
of assets, and consideration for the impact of a single security on the 
overall portfolio.19As a result, single investment selections – including 
mission investments – should not be evaluated based on their individual 
risk/return characteristics, but in the context of the portfolio’s overall risk/
return characteristics. The modern prudent investor rule also prohibits an 
evaluation of prudence based on hindsight; the prudence of an investment 
decision must be determined based on the facts available at the time the 
investment was made. The rule imposes a duty of loyalty upon the prudent 
investor, which is consistent with the business judgment rule that we fi nd in 
state corporations laws, and in the Uniform Management of Institutional 
Funds Act (“UMIFA”).20 Stated simply, the business judgment rule holds that 
a court will not second-guess a business decision – including an investment 
decision – so long as it is made with due care and loyalty in the exercise 
of “business judgment.” In practice, as discussed below, no cases or state 
attorneys general opinions consider investment decisions by foundation 
fi duciaries, except in the case of self-dealing or fl agrant negligence. 
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The three uniform acts that this section of the report considers are: 
 • The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act  
  (UPMIFA)
 • The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (UMIFA),  
  which UPMIFA repeals and replaces; and
 • The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA). 
In order to illustrate how these laws interplay, we have considered the 
fi duciary duties owed to private foundations under the state laws of two 
jurisdictions in which many U.S. foundations operate — California and 
New York — and the state laws of Oregon, in which the practice of mission 
investing is quickly developing. These case studies appear in the Appendices 
at E through G.
Having considered the legality of mission investing under federal tax and 
relevant state laws, we turn in Part II to consider how foundations engage in 
mission investing in practice. In Part III, we identify areas of the law in which 
clarifi cation would simplify the legal analysis necessary before engaging 
in a mission investment, and thereby enhance the potential impact of the 
philanthropic fi eld, and provide recommendations to foundations that wish 
to engage in mission investing squarely within the requirements of the law. 
And lastly, in Part IV, we conclude with a brief summary of our fi ndings.
Our goal in producing this report is modest in focusing on the bridge 
between foundation investments and grantmaking objectives. We aim to 
clear a path for foundations confounded by perceived legal restraints on 
mission investing, so that they will be empowered to explore investing 
consistently with their charitable missions, and thereby use the full range 
of their resources to achieve greater social impact. By engaging in mission 
investing side by side with effective grantmaking, we hope that not only will 
individual foundations amplify their capacity to advance their missions, but 
the social problems they seek to resolve may be addressed more effectively. 
Many of these problems are urgent and dire — climate change, poverty 
alleviation, and global health are just a few such examples — and demand 
that foundations leverage every resource available. 
What laws and regulations determine the legality of 
“mission investing”?
The investment activities of private foundations are regulated both by 
federal tax law, and by state fi duciary law. Community foundations, by 
contrast, are not defi ned by the federal tax code as “private foundations,” 
but as public charities. While both types of vehicles are subject to the tax 
rules fl owing from qualifi cation as a charitable organization under I.R.C. 
501(c)(3), the I.R.C. applies strict prohibitions on investment holdings only 
to private foundations. However, in general, the same fi duciary standards 
of care, loyalty, and prudent investment applicable to private foundations 
will apply to community foundations.
Part I of this report considers the legality of mission investing under the 
I.R.C.’s restrictions on private foundation investment activity, and state 
fi duciary law. Specifi cally, I.R.C. 4944(a) levies a tax on investments that are 
deemed by the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) to subject the foundation 
to undue risk. I.R.C. 4944(c) provides an exception to that by explicitly 
permitting “program-related investments” that aim primarily to advance the 
charitable purposes of the foundation, so long as the production of income 
or appreciation of property is not a signifi cant purpose and lobbying is not 
supported by the investment. Our analysis focuses on these laws, and related 
regulations and guidance issued by the I.R.S. 
Determining the legality of mission investing under state law requires a 
close look at three uniform acts that have been adopted by many states, as 
well as an analysis of the general fi duciary duties underlying state nonprofi t 
corporation and trust laws. The prudent investor rule, the duties of care 
and loyalty, and the business judgment rule provide the framework for the 
relevant state laws.
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Part I:
Legal Restrictions on Mission 
Investing by U.S. Foundations
A. FEDERAL TAX LAWS
1. Introduction
Every charitable vehicle in the United States defi ned under federal tax law 
as a private foundation is governed by a small set of regulations under the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”), regardless of the state in which it 
is established, and regardless of its legal character as a trust or nonprofi t 
corporation. The relevant law was promulgated under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, which aimed to curb abuses perceived as violative of the tax 
exemption granted to private foundations.21 
Our analysis of the legality of mission investing under the federal tax 
regulations focuses on I.R.C. § 4944, which prohibits investments that 
“jeopardize the carrying out” of any of a foundation’s exempt purposes.22 
“Jeopardy” investments have been interpreted under the Tax Reform 
Act’s legislative history and the examples issued under the regulation 
interpreting I.R.C. § 4944(a) as those that are unduly risky, and therefore 
subject the foundation to unreasonable risk of loss. The section also 
carves out an exception to the jeopardy investment rule, termed program-
related investments (PRIs).23 An investment will qualify as a PRI and will 
thereby not trigger the jeopardizing investment tax, even if it is highly 
risky, so long as its primary purpose is to accomplish one or more of 
the foundation’s charitable purposes, and no signifi cant purpose is the 
production of income or the appreciation of property.24 (A thorough 
discussion of PRIs occurs below at I.A.3.) An additional exception to the 
prohibition carves out investments received as gifts to the foundation.
21 For an excellent account of  the legislative history and an analysis of  the Tax Reform Act of  1969, and
  the regulations under it applicable to private foundations, see Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering
  Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59 (2004).
22 I.R.C. § 4944.
23 I.R.C. § 4944(c).
24 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1). 
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Under § 4944, the I.R.C. imposes an excise tax on jeopardy investments. 
Notably, the I.R.S.’s sanctions on jeopardy investments merely impose a tax, and 
do not extend to the withdrawal of the foundation’s tax-exempt status, unless a 
private foundation willfully and repeatedly or fl agrantly violates I.R.C. § 4944.25 
Our research disclosed no case in which the I.R.S. has withdrawn a foundation’s 
tax-exempt status under this section.
While § 4944 is the most relevant section of the I.R.C. for the purposes of this 
report, it is not the sole section relevant to private foundations. I.R.C. §§ 4940 
through 4946 include prohibitions against self-dealing26 and excess business 
holdings, among other prohibited activity. In general, the excess business holdings 
rules of I.R.C. § 4943 limit the extent of a private foundation’s investment in 
a business entity to twenty percent of the voting or ownership interest in the 
entity.27 The Tax Reform Act of 1969 imposed this limit out of a concern that 
a foundation holding a controlling interest in a business would be distracted 
from furthering its charitable mission, and might obtain an unfair advantage 
over businesses that pay taxes on income derived from businesses. Notably, 
investments that qualify as program-related investments are not subject to the 
excess business holdings rule.28 The “Unrelated Business Income Tax” (UBIT) 
derives from another provision of the I.R.C. relevant to private foundations. 
UBIT imposes a tax on income derived from commercial activity not substantially 
related to the exempt purposes of a charitable organization.29 We do not examine 
sections of the I.R.C. beyond § 4944; however, we note that all foundation 
investments – including mission investments – are subject to these restrictions.30
When applying § 4944, investments can fall into one of three categories:
• Jeopardizing investments
• Program-related investments
• Investments that are neither jeopardizing nor program-related.
We consider each in turn.
2. Jeopardy Investments 
What elements of an investment are relevant to a determination that it 
may jeopardize a foundation’s capacity to fulfi ll its exempt purposes? The 
Treasury regulation issued under this section of the I.R.C. incorporates 
principles of the prudent investor standard that also undergirds state 
fi duciary laws in setting out the following determinants, while not 
invoking the term “prudent investor”: 
 • The foundation managers, in making the investment, failed to  
  exercise ordinary business care and prudence;
 • The standard of care and prudence applied by foundation   
  managers failed to take due consideration of risk, return, and  
  portfolio diversifi cation;
 • Due consideration for the facts and circumstances prevailing at  
  the time of making the investment is relevant, and not how those  
  facts and circumstances appear with the wisdom of hindsight;
 • The investment under scrutiny will be considered individually,  
  within the context of the foundation’s overall portfolio;
 • The investment jeopardizes the long-term and short-term fi nancial 
  needs of the foundation.31
25 I.R.C. § 507(a)(2).
26 I.R.C. § 4941.
27 I.R.C. § 4943. For a succinct summary of the federal tax regulations applicable to private foundations,  
  see BETSY ADLER, INGRID MITTERMAIER & DAVID LEVITT, THE RULES OF THE ROAD: A GUIDE TO  
  THE LAW OF CHARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES Chapter 4 (2007).
28 Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-10(b).
29 I.R.C. § 511.
30 But note again that a qualifying program-related investment is not subject to the excess business  
  holdings rules of I.R.C. § 4943. See supra note 28.
 
31 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) provides: Except as provided in § 4944(c), 53.4944-3, 53.4944-6(a), 
  and subdivision (ii) of  this subparagraph, an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying
  out of  the exempt purposes of a private foundation if  it is determined that the foundation managers, in
  making such investment, have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence, under the facts
  and circumstances prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for the long- and short-
  term fi nancial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt purposes. In the exercise of the requisite
  standard of care and prudence the foundation managers may take into account the expected return
  (including both income and appreciation of capital), the risks of rising and falling price levels, and the
  need for diversifi cation within the investment portfolio (for example, with respect to type of security, type
  of  industry, maturity of  company, degree of risk and potential for return). The determination whether the
  investment of  a particular amount jeopardizes the carrying out of  the exempt purposes of a foundation
  shall be made on an investment by investment basis, in each case taking into account the foundation’s
  portfolio as a whole. No category of investments shall be treated as a per se violation of §4944.
  However, the following are examples of types or methods of investment which will be closely scrutinized
  to determine whether the foundation managers have met the requisite standard of care and prudence:
  Trading in securities on margin, trading in commodity futures, investments in working interests in oil and
  gas wells, the purchase of  “puts,” “calls,” and “straddles,” the purchase of  warrants, and selling
  short. The determination whether the investment of  any amount jeopardizes the carrying out of  a
  foundation’s exempt purposes is to be made as of  the time that the foundation makes the investmen
  and not subsequently on the basis of  hindsight. Therefore, once it has been ascertained that an
  investment does not jeopardize the carrying out of  a foundation’s exempt purposes, the investment
  shall never be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of  such purposes, even though, as a result
  of  such investment, the foundation subsequently realizes a loss.
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The regulation notes that no category of investments will be treated as per 
se jeopardizing, but then proceeds to set out a list of types of investment 
activity that may trigger scrutiny.32 One interesting aspect of these suspect 
activities is that the I.R.S.’s view of speculative activity has indeed evolved, 
although that evolution has progressed slowly and generally well behind 
market practice. Current guidance issued by the I.R.S. to its staff in 
1998 lists the following strategies as deserving of close scrutiny: equity 
investments in “third world countries;” investments in hedge funds; junk 
bonds, derivatives, risk arbitrage, and distressed debt.33 Many of these 
asset classes are now considered by leading investment managers and 
consultants to constitute integral components of a prudently diversifi ed 
investment portfolio.
The broad-brush examples provided under the regulation illustrate 
the importance of exercising care and prudence in making investment 
decisions.34 Where consideration for an investment’s earnings record, 
capitalization, and risk/return profi le informs an investment decision, no 
jeopardizing character will likely be imputed to it by the I.R.S. Portfolio 
diversifi cation and provision for a foundation’s short- and long-term 
fi nancial needs also weigh in favor of a fi nding that an investment does 
not violate the prohibition.35 The I.R.S. has stopped short of enunciating a 
bright-line defi nition of what percentage of a foundation’s assets invested 
in any one security or investment strategy will be deemed “jeopardizing”; 
as a result, we do not have clear guidance on diversifi cation requirements. 
The law and the regulations issued under it have historically been interpreted 
as requiring consideration only for the fi nancial impact of an investment on 
a foundation’s capacity to fulfi ll its charitable purposes. But if we expand the 
boundaries of the jeopardy investment rule to consider social impact, we 
quickly arrive at the observation that by defi nition, a mission investment is 
made precisely to fulfi ll those purposes. How then can it jeopardize the foundation’s 
ability to accomplish what the investment by defi nition achieves? The law as it has 
been interpreted does not  integrate a concern for fi nancial sustainability with an 
imperative on fulfi lling charitable purposes in any but the narrowest sense.
 
The resulting confusion as to what constitutes a jeopardy investment has generated, 
over the almost forty years in which it has been in place, a proliferation of legal 
analysis. Yet almost all of the guidance issued under the rule focuses on whether 
an investment will qualify for the program-related exception to the rule. Few cases 
address a substantive violation of the rule.36 The private letter rulings (PLRs)37 
interpreting the rule number over a thousand, yet most address procedural 
questions, or exemption as a “program-related investment.”38 Very few grapple 
with the defi nition of a “jeopardy investment.” Revenue rulings39 and technical 
advice memoranda (TAM)40 also provide only limited guidance. The following 
summary gleans the available guidance from those PLRs and TAM that determined 
a jeopardizing investment was at issue:
 • Investments in unsecured loans were found to be jeopardizing (1981)41
 • Investment in asset collateralizations were found to be jeopardizing   
  (1986)42
32 Id. These include trading in margin securities or commodity futures; investing in working interests in
  oil and gas wells; purchasing puts, calls, straddles, or warrants; and short-selling. But see infra notes
  43-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of private letter rulings determining that certain of
  these vehicles are not per se jeopardizing.
33 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS HANDBOOK, § 7.27.18.2.3 (1998)
  (discussing Close Scrutiny of Certain Investments), available at:
  http://www.irs.gov/irm/part7/ch12s15.html#d0e117979. The I.R.S. issues staff  manuals to provide
  instructions in interpreting the law and regulations under the I.R.C.
34 For the full text of  the examples, see infra Appendix A.
35 By contrast, a lack of diversifi cation may lead in part to a fi nding that an investment is jeopardizing.
  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-05-001 (Jan. 31, 1992).
36  But see Janpol v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 518 (1993)(holding that guarantees or collateralizations are a 
  type of money lending or an extension of credit and, thus, are forms of investment activity and
  deserve close scrutiny); Thorne v. Comm’r, 99 T.C. 67 (1992) (holding that the investment of  the
  entire corpus of a foundation in a foreign bank without inquiring into the integrity of  the bank was 
  a jeopardizing investment).
37  A private letter ruling is a written statement issued by the I.R.S. in response to a request from a
  taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the taxpayer’s specifi c set of  facts. It is binding on 
  the taxpayer, but may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or I.R.S. personnel.
38 See analysis of  private letter rulings and revenue rulings under § 4944(c) infra at Part I.A.3.c.
39  A revenue ruling is an offi cial interpretation by the I.R.S. of  the I.R.C. and regulations issued under it, 
  and may be relied upon as precedent.
40 A technical advice memorandum consists of  guidance furnished by the I.R.S.’s Offi ce of Chief Counsel
  upon the request of  an I.R.S. director or area director in response to technical or procedural questions that
  develop during a proceeding, such as an examination of a taxpayer’s return. Technical advice memoranda
  provide the I.R.S.’ interpretation of proper application of tax laws, regulations, revenue rulings, or other
  precedents.
41  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-06-036 (1982).
42  See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-27-001 (July 5, 1996).
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By contrast, PLRs have determined that the following investments would not 
be considered to be jeopardizing:
 • Small cap stocks (1997)43
 • Venture capital funds (1997)44
 • Distressed securities (1997)45 
 • Oil and gas interests (1994)46 
 • Commodities contracts (1992)47 
An emphasis on the exercise of due care and prudence in making an 
investment recurs in the limited rulings on jeopardy investments. 
If the I.R.S. determines that a foundation has made a jeopardizing investment, 
the I.R.C. imposes a tiered tax on the foundation48and potentially on the 
foundation managers, if they knew the investment at issue would constitute 
a jeopardizing investment.49
These penalties can be substantial, if imposed, which occurs rarely. 
The power of the prohibition appears to lie in the threat of its use, 
rather than its actual application.  
On the other hand, merely making a jeopardy investment does not threaten 
the foundation’s overall portfolio nor does it put the foundation’s tax-exempt 
status at risk (except in the case of fl agrant and repeated violations). Further, 
if an investment is determined to jeopardize the carrying out of a foundation’s 
exempt purposes, the foundation can divest of it, and the foundation can request 
that the applicable tax may be abated or refunded, so long as the violation 
was corrected within the required correction period, and the proceeds of the 
divestment were not recycled into another jeopardizing investment.50 
 
3. Program-Related Investments 
a. Introduction
While the prohibition against jeopardizing investments aims to ensure that a 
foundation will be in a fi nancial position to execute its charitable purposes year 
after year, an exception to the prohibition expressly permits a foundation to 
make investments that may resemble grants, and must be closely related to its 
charitable purposes, without regard for the investment’s fi nancial performance. 
I.R.C. § 4944(c) provides this exception to the jeopardy investment prohibition 
for “program-related investments,” or PRIs. An investment will not trigger the 
jeopardizing investment tax, even if it is highly risky, so long as it satisfi es the 
following three-pronged test: 
 • the investment’s primary purpose is to accomplish one or more of  
  the [exempt] purposes [of the foundation],51
 • no signifi cant purpose of the investment is to generate fi nancial  
  return,52 and
 • no lobbying activity will be supported by it.53
 
43  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-23-045 (June 6, 1997).
44  Id.
45  Id.
46  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-51-067 (Dec. 23, 1994).
47  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-37-035 (Sept. 11, 1992).
48  I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1) states: “If  a private foundation invests any amount in such a manner as to
  jeopardize the carrying out of  any of its exempt purposes, there is hereby imposed on the making
  of  such investment a tax equal to 10 percent of  the amount so invested for each year (or part thereof)
  in the taxable period.” The amount of  the initial tax was doubled from 5 to 10 percent under the
  Pension Protection Act of  2006, effective for tax years commencing after August 17, 2006. The term
  “taxable period” means, with respect to any investment which jeopardizes the carrying out of  exempt
  purposes, the period beginning with the date on which the amount is so invested and ending on the
  earliest of:
   (A)  the date of mailing of a notice of defi ciency with respect to the tax imposed by   
    subsection (a)(1) under section 6212, 
   (B)  the date on which the tax imposed by subsection (a)(1) is assessed, or 
   (C)  the date on which the amount so invested is removed from jeopardy. 
49  I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2). Knowledge under this provision shall be found to be present if  the manager had
 adequate facts about the investment to determine that it would be a jeopardizing investment, was
 aware that the investment might violate the prohibition against jeopardizing investments, and failed to
 make reasonable attempts to determine whether the investment was a jeopardizing investment.
 Treas. Reg. 53.4944-1(b)(2)(i). The application of the tax is complex.  See I.R.C. §§ 4944(a)(2), 
 (b)(1)-(2), and 4944(d)(1)-(2), as amended by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 at U.S.C. § 4944(d)(1).
50 I.R.C. § 4944(e)(2) (stating that an investment that jeopardizes the carrying out of  exempt purposes shall
  be considered to be removed from jeopardy when such investment is sold or otherwise disposed of,
  and the proceeds of such sale or other disposition are not investments that jeopardize the carrying out 
  of  exempt purposes).
51 Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(a)(1)(i). Qualifying exempt purposes of a private foundation are described in
   I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B), and are as follows: religious, charitable, scientifi c, literary, or educational purposes,
  or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if  no part of  its activities involve
  the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
52 Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(a)(1)(ii).
53 Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(a)(1)(iii).
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This provision allows a foundation to allocate assets to investments that 
may generate little or no fi nancial return and which, in fact, may be 
treated by the foundation more like grants than investments. The I.R.C. 
permits a foundation to treat amounts expended in connection with a 
program-related investment toward the statutory minimum fi ve percent 
payout in the year made.54 
Because a PRI as a matter of defi nition must be made with fi nancial return 
as an ancillary consideration, investments that are motivated by charitable 
objectives are clearly legal under the federal tax regulations. Determining 
whether an investment is a PRI, however, is not so easily done.
 
What is a qualifying charitable purpose?
In order to qualify as a PRI, an investment must be made primarily to 
further the accomplishment of the private foundation’s exempt activities, 
and only if the investment would not have been made but for the close 
relationship between the investment and the foundation’s exempt activities.55 
Interestingly, a qualifying investment may be made in either a tax-exempt or 
a taxable organization, so long as the organization provides the means by 
which the foundation’s charitable purposes are accomplished.56 We explore 
more closely below the defi nition of a“qualifying charitable purpose” that 
has evolved in the context of program-related investments.
How much fi nancial return is permissible in a PRI?
In determining whether a “signifi cant purpose” of an investment is the 
production of income or the appreciation of property, a key consideration 
turns on whether investors engaging in the investment solely for profi t 
would be likely to make the investment on the same terms as the private 
foundation.57 The fact that an investment produces signifi cant income or 
capital appreciation does not, in the absence of other factors, offer conclusive 
evidence of a signifi cant purpose involving the production of income or the 
appreciation of property. The guidance under the regulations indicates that 
so long as the intent to produce income or appreciation did not constitute a 
signifi cant reason for the investment at the time that it was made, the subsequent 
generation of market-rate or above-market rate returns will not disqualify 
the investment as a PRI.58 A close analysis of the regulations in conjunction 
with the relevant private letter rulings that consider questions of permissible 
fi nancial return suggests that so long as the charitable purpose of the investment 
constitutes the primary purpose of making it, and any fi nancial return is 
secondary, the investment will qualify as a PRI. The I.R.S. looks closely for 
indications that a foundation is investing on terms that in one way or another 
are inferior to those that a purely commercial investor would accept. 
 
What kinds of investments are permissible?
While PRIs frequently take the form of loans, they are not limited to this asset 
class. Credit enhancement instruments, equity investments, and real estate 
investments are among those that have been deemed permissible by the I.R.S.59
b. Guidance Provided under Regulations 
 Interpreting the Law
The Treasury Regulations issued under I.R.C. § 4944 provide clear examples of 
what constitutes a program-related investment.60 These examples can be relied upon 
as guidance by a foundation seeking to interpret § 4944. However, they were issued 
in 1972 and appear almost quaint against the backdrop of the current policy and 
investment environment. Nonetheless, they codify the following useful points:
 • A loan having a below-market interest rate to a business closely tied 
  to the charitable purposes of the lending foundation which was unable
   to procure funds from conventional sources of capital at feasible rates
  will qualify as a PRI, even if it generates profi t equal to or higher than
  earnings from conventional portfolio investments;
54 I.R.C. § 4942; Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2)(i).
55 Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(a)(2)(i).
56 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) provides that a PRI may be made to organizations other than exempt
   organizations; Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162 clarifi es this in fi nding that a qualifying PRI need not
  be made to a tax-exempt entity, as the entity is “merely the instrument[s]” by which charitable
  purposes were accomplished.
57 Treas. Reg. § 53-4944-3(a)(2)(iii).
58  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2). See also Plumsted Theatre Soc’y v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980),
   aff’d, 675 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982)(holding that potential profi t will not disqualify an investment as a PRI,
   so long as profi t is not a signifi cant purpose of the investment).
59 For a full list of  private letter rulings approving program-related investments across asset classes, 
  see infra Appendix B.
60 A list of  approved PRIs by asset class is set out at Appendix C.
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 • An equity investment in a business that will enable it to expand
  will qualify as a PRI, even if the potential for profi t exists,
  given that the business’ activities advance the charitable purposes
  of the foundation;
 • A loan having a below-market rate of interest to a business that
   advances the charitable purposes of the foundation will qualify 
  as a PRI;
 • An interest-free loan to an individual to pursue an education
  qualifi es as a PRI, where the lending foundation’s charitable
  purposes would be advanced by making the loan;
 • An investment in a low-income housing strategy insured by the
  Federal Housing Administration qualifi es as a PRI. 
 • By contrast, an equity investment in a company that has no
   relationship with the charitable purposes of the foundation does
   not qualify as a PRI.
As noted, since 1972 when these examples were issued, social policy, corporate 
vehicles, and capital markets have evolved. The boundaries established by these 
examples have long since been expanded upon in practice, and some of these 
have been blessed by the I.R.S. through individual PLRs or revenue rulings 
(discussed below). 
In May 2002, a working group of the American Bar Association’s Section 
on Taxation requested the I.R.S. to consider proposed new examples.61 This 
request sought to modernize the interpretation of the existing law, not a change 
to the law itself. The Council on Foundations has also requested that the I.R.S. 
consider including the proposed new PRI examples. Most of these seek to codify 
determinations of qualifying PRIs in private letter rulings. Appendix D sets out 
the full text of the examples.
Defi nition of qualifying charitable activity
The proposed new examples seek the I.R.S.’ clarifi cation that the following activities, 
among others, would qualify as charitable under the PRI test: an activity conducted 
in a foreign country that qualifi es as charitable when conducted in the United States, 
activities supporting economic development to recover from a terrorist attack or a 
natural disaster, and activity that will “lessen the burdens of government.”
Defi nition of “signifi cant purpose”
In order to clarify the I.R.S.’s defi nition of “signifi cant purpose,” the new 
examples propose that the I.R.S. consider the following to qualify as program-
related investments: an investment with high-return potential, a loan made at 
a market rate of interest, an above-market rate loan – so long as some other 
term of the loan is less attractive than the terms available to for-profi t lenders, an 
equity investment in a for-profi t entity that has a reasonable risk-adjusted return. 
The proposed new examples would codify recent private letter rulings already 
issued by the I.R.S. This codifi cation would enable foundations generally to rely 
upon them, and would modernize the guidance available to foundations under 
the Treasury regulations. To date, the I.R.S. has not responded to the request. 
c. Guidance Provided Under Private Letter Rulings 
 on Proposed Program-Related Investments and
 Revenue Rulings 
In addition to the examples provided in the Treasury Regulations under 
§ 4944, foundations do look for guidance in the Private Letter Rulings, or 
PLRs, that the I.R.S. has issued in response to specifi c requests from foundations 
seeking an affi rmative exemption from the jeopardy investment tax. More 
than one hundred PLRs on substantive issues of § 4944(c) have been issued. 
With rare exception, the I.R.S. generally rules that the proposed investment is 
program related, which is no surprise given the careful tailoring that goes on 
within the request for a ruling by the foundation and its lawyers. Due to the 
specifi city of the fact patterns under the PLRs, and their lack of precedential 
value, they offer only suggestive guidance to other foundations as to the I.R.S.’s 
disposition toward a particular set of facts; nonetheless, in the absence of better 
authority, they serve as general guideposts.
The body of PLRs issued by the I.R.S. includes several that address specifi c 
programmatic areas. Examples include architectural conservation, community 
or economic development, conservation easements, ecological preservation, 
and independent media in formerly closed societies. Prominent programmatic 
categories, though, include housing, community/economic development, and 
environmental and ecological matters. Each of these main categories will be 
discussed in turn.
61 See Appendix D for the full text of  the proposed examples.
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Foundations may also seek guidance under § 4944 in revenue rulings issued by I.R.S. 
Unlike private letter rulings, revenue rulings do carry precedential value, and may 
be relied on broadly by taxpayers. Relevant revenue rulings are discussed below, 
as well.
i. Housing
Foundations have succeeded in obtaining positive rulings from the I.R.S. relating 
to housing investments in the United States and abroad. The investments consist 
of loans as well as equity investments, such as contributing monies to a fund, or 
buying stock in a for-profi t corporation that provides housing development in 
blighted areas. 
In each of these rulings, the investing foundation met the requirements that the 
investment have a close tie to the charitable purposes of the foundation, and that 
no signifi cant purpose of the investment consist of generating income or the 
appreciation of property,62 for example: 
 • A loan at fi ve percent to a for-profi t partnership to purchase buildings 
  in a blighted area of a city and convert the buildings to apartment 
  complexes for low-income individuals,63 
• A no-interest loan to a for-profi t corporation to develop 500 housing 
  units for the working poor,64 
 • An investment in a mixed-income housing project in a deteriorated   
  area of a city.65 
Revenue rulings that consider the defi nition of a qualifying “charitable 
purpose” and have been cited in interpreting § 4944(c) include:
 • the provision of interest-free loans to homeowners in a badly   
  deteriorated urban residential area,66 
 • the provision of below-market interest rate loans to low-income  
  residents who cannot obtain mortgages at conventional lending  
  institutions,67
 • the provision of low-income housing for the aged in an economically  
  depressed neighborhood.68
Perhaps the most signifi cant guidance for housing PRIs lies in a 1996 
Revenue Procedure issued by the I.R.S., which sets forth a safe harbor and 
a facts-and-circumstances test under which organizations that provide 
low-income housing are considered charitable.69 The safe harbor requires 
at least seventy-fi ve percent of the units to be occupied by people qualifi ed 
as “low-income” under defi nitions issued by the U.S. Housing and Urban 
Development Department (“HUD”).70 Given the evidence that mixed-
income housing more effectively contributes to economic development than 
low-income housing, and the evolution of social policy accordingly, this 
“safe harbor” no longer refl ects best practices in investing for community 
development.
 
62 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200408035 (Feb. 20, 2004); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200331006 (Aug. 1, 2003); I.R.S. Priv.
  Ltr. Rul. 200331007 (Aug. 1, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200331005 (Aug. 1, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.   
  20031008 (Aug. 1, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-48-052 (Nov. 29, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-31-046 
  (Aug. 2, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-12-013 (Mar. 22, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-078 (Apr. 20, 1990);
  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-23-071 (June 9, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-23-070 (June 9, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
  88-32-058 (Aug. 12, 1988); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-47-084 (Aug. 29, 1985); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-23-072 
  (Mar. 13, 1978). Further examples may be found in Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b), which provides clear
  illustrations of acceptable program related investments in the programmatic area of housing.
63 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-48-052 (Nov. 21, 1991); See generally I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-31-046 
  (Aug. 2, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-12-013 (Mar. 22, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-078 
  (Apr. 20, 1990).
64 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-23-070 (June 9, 1989); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-23-071 (June 9, 1989).
65 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-23-072 (Mar. 13, 1978).
66 Rev. Rul. 76-408, 1976-2 C.B. 145.
67 Id.
68 Rev. Rul. 75-198, 1975-1 C.B. 157.
69 Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717.
70 HUD defi nes “low-income” housing as follows: eighty percent of  an area’s median income, which may
   be adjusted to refl ect economic differences and family sizes. In addition to the 75% “low income” rule,
   either at least twenty percent of  the units must be occupied by “very low-income” residents (defi ned by
   HUD as fi fty percent of  an area’s median income, subject to adjustments), or forty percent of  the
   units must be occupied by residents that do not exceed one hundred twenty percent of  the area’s “very
   low-income” limit. Finally, up to twenty-fi ve percent of  the units may be provided at market rates to
   persons having incomes in excess of the low-income limit. Id.
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 ii. Community/Economic Development
Community/economic development also constitutes an important programmatic 
area in which several private letter rulings and revenue rulings have been issued 
qualifying both loans and equity investments as program-related.71 Taken together, 
these rulings suggest the following boundaries of permissible program-related 
investments in this area, subject to meeting the conditions that the investment is 
closely tied to the charitable purposes of the foundation, and no signifi cant 
purpose of the investment is to generate income or the appreciation of property: 
 • an equity investment in a fund that invests in businesses based in 
  low income communities, where those businesses were owned or   
  controlled by minorities and other disadvantaged groups;72
 • an investment program to lend or make capital contributions to a  
  foreign government in order to promote economic development,   
  with the production of employment opportunities;73 
 • a no-interest loan program to provide funds to a foreign    
  government that would then lend the funds to local banks at   
  below-market interest rates to promote economic development;74 
 • an equity investment in a for-profi t corporation that provides seed
   money to start-up businesses and thereby creates jobs for the  
  unemployed and underemployed and lessen economic depression;75 
 • an investment program consisting of loans and grants to
  community development corporations to combat community   
  deterioration;76 
 • an equity investment in a for-profi t organization that would  
  provide economic development in a blighted area of a city;77 
 • a loan to an exempt organization that combats community
  deterioration through the purchase and resale of parcels of land
  to developers in deteriorating areas of a city.78 
By contrast, the I.R.S. has ruled against a private foundation’s request for a 
determination that its 100 percent ownership and operation of a for-profi t inn 
located in a historic community qualify as a program-related investment.79 
While the purpose of the private foundation was to preserve, create, and 
promote the architectural heritage of a certain town, the I.R.S. held that the 
investment did not, due to its for-profi t character, adequately further the 
foundation’s charitable purposes. 
The revenue rulings focused on foundation investments within the community 
and economic development fi eld have determined the following activities to 
meet the test of a “qualifying charitable purpose”:
 • acquisition of an industrial park in an economically depressed   
  community,80 
 • a nonprofi t small business investment company that provides low-cost
   or long-term loans to businesses unable to procure funds from
   conventional commercial sources,81
 • investment in an organization funded by a U.S. government agency
   that supports industrial enterprises to locate new facilities in an   
  economically depressed urban community,82 and, interestingly,
 • the preservation or improvement of a community even if that   
  community is not in decline, so long as the community interests  
  served are truly public in scope.83
71 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200331006 (Aug. 1, 2003); I.R.S.
   Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200036050 (Sept. 8, 2000); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943058 (Oct. 29, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
  Rul. 199943044 (Oct. 29, 1999); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199910066 (Mar. 12, 1999); IR.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
  98-26-048 (June 26, 1998); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-20-039 (Nov. 29, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-48-052
  (Nov. 29, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-48-049 (Nov. 29, 1991); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-16-078 (Apr. 20,
  1990); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-49-039 (Sept. 10, 1985); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-39-068 (June 30, 1981).
72  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006).
73  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200036050 (Sept. 8, 2000).
74  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943058 (Oct. 29, 1999).
75 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943044 (Oct. 29, 1999). In the fi rst private letter ruling to be issued under
  4944(c), in 1977 the I.R.S. ruled on a proposed investment by a private foundation in a small business
   investment company (“SBIC”) that would help a community with high unemployment rates. The I.R.S. ruled
  that the proposed investment would not qualify as a program-related investment on the grounds that the
   SBIC would be organized and operated as a for-profi t company. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-42-062 (1977).
  This line of reasoning was soon superseded by the examples under Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(c), and
   subsequent private letter rulings. 
76 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-20-039 (May 17, 1996).
77 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-49-039 (Sept. 10, 1985).
78 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-39-068 (June 30, 1981).
79 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-40-002 (Oct. 8, 1993).
80 Rev. Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146.
81 Rev. Rul. 81-284, 1981-2 C.B. 130. 
82  Rev. Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146.
83  Rev. Rul. 76-147, 1976-1 C.B. 151.
32 © 2008 FSG Social Impact Advisors PART I 33
iii. Environmental/Ecological Matters
In several private letter rulings, the I.R.S. has determined proposed program-
related investments that advance environmental purposes to qualify.84 Private 
foundations have made investments for environmental projects that were loans 
and/or grants, and in some instances, equity investments. Qualifying activities 
include running a farm, underwriting conservation easements, balancing 
biological resources with economic development, buying and maintaining 
ecologically signifi cant lands, maintaining biological facilities, creating a 
policy research center on environmental matters, and buying an ecologically 
signifi cant island.85 Specifi c examples follow:
 • A private foundation that operated a farm in a foreign country for
   the purpose of preservation and demonstration of how advanced
   agricultural methods may be used to improve productivity was
   determined to have made a qualifying program-related equity
  investment.86 
 • No-interest or below-interest loans to developers for the purchase
   of environmentally sensitive undeveloped lands that were subject to
   development pressures were deemed qualifying program-related
   investments, so long as conservation easements were incorporated.87
 • Investment in ecologically and archaeologically signifi cant land 
  qualifi ed as a program-related investment.88 
 • Investment in a for-profi t corporation that provided fi nancing
  and promoted environmentally oriented businesses that would
   contribute to conservation and economic development in
  economically and/or environmentally sensitive areas within a
  specifi ed region was found to qualify as program-related.89 
 
4.  Mission Investments That Do Not Qualify 
 as Program-related Investments
How should foundations think about mission investments that do not qualify as 
PRIs — either because making a profi t is a signifi cant purpose of the investment, 
or because the social objective is not adequately linked to the foundation’s exempt 
purposes? If the investment is made at market rate, and fi ts within the foundation’s 
overall investment policy, then it falls well within the prudent investor standard. 
The fact that social or environmental considerations were weighed along with more 
traditional fi nancial analysis does not render it a jeopardy investment, nor would 
such considerations offer any legal basis for second-guessing the investment decision. 
Alternatively, if the investment carries a lower risk-adjusted return than a market 
rate investment within the same asset class, a foundation may decide to make the 
investment in order to further its mission while still primarily intending to earn a 
fi nancial return. Under these circumstances, the investment would not qualify as a 
PRI and, one might argue, the lower fi nancial return could impact the foundation’s 
ability to fulfi ll its long-term charitable purposes, and thereby trigger the prohibition 
against jeopardy investments. 
We have found no legal precedent or letter rulings that specifi cally address these 
circumstances. However, based on available I.R.S. guidance to I.R.C. § 4944, we 
reason as follows:
 1.  Donor Intent Prevails: If the donor expressly permitted the
  consideration of mission-related criteria, or did not intend that the
  foundation constitute a permanent endowment, then neither the short-
  nor the long-term objectives of the foundation will be defeated by   
  making a below-market mission investment, and the jeopardy 
  investment prohibition will not apply;
 2. No Erosion of  Value: If the investment is at least anticipated to
   keep pace with infl ation (after payout), then the original value of the
  gift has not been eroded and the foundation’s ability to carry out its 
  long-term objectives has not been jeopardized. Although the foundation’s
  asset growth may be slower than it would theoretically have been by
  investing in a market rate investment, the minimum fi nancial
  requirements have been met, and the trustees or directors should have 
  the discretion to trade off the option of excess appreciation against
  investments that advance the foundation’s mission;
84  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200343028 (Oct. 24, 2003); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200222034 (May 31, 2002); I.R.S.  
  Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200136026 (Sept. 7, 2001); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-26-044 (July 1, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  
  88-42-067 (Oct. 21, 1988); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-08-067 (Dec. 1, 1986); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-44-060  
  (Aug. 6, 1981).
85  Organizations engaged in the conservation of natural resources have been recognized as exempt under  
  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 128; Rev. Rul. 76-204 1976-1 C.B. 152.
86  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200343028 (Oct. 24, 2003).
87  See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200222034 (May 31, 2002).
88 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-26-044 (July 1, 1994); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-44-060 (Aug. 6, 1981).
89 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200136026 (Sept. 7, 2001).
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3. Whole Portfolio: The risk-adjusted return of a mission investment
  may be cushioned by other portfolio investments so that it does not 
  materially diminish the long-term fi nancial performance of the 
  portfolio as a whole. For example: 
  • the risk-adjusted return of the mission investment may be mitigated 
   because it is inversely related to the risk-adjusted return of other
   assets in the portfolio, 
  • the portfolio as a whole may earn offsetting returns that at 
   least equal the rate of infl ation (after payout), or
  • the mission investment may be so small as to be immaterial to
   the foundation’s overall ability to serve its long-term objectives.
5. Summary
In summary, federal tax law applicable to private foundations permits investments 
with a risk/return profi le that falls within the bounds of a reasonable asset 
allocation strategy — so long as that overall investment strategy has been 
developed with care and consideration for the short- and long-term needs of the 
foundation, and for its charitable purpose. This conclusion applies to market-rate 
mission investments, as well as to conventional investments that are made without 
consideration for advancing the charitable purpose of the foundation. 
Those mission investments made with social impact as the highest priority, and 
with fi nancial performance deemed to have no signifi cant purpose, should qualify 
as permissible investments under the program-related investments exception to 
the jeopardy investment prohibition. As discussed above, the connection between 
the foundation’s charitable purpose and the investment itself must be strong, such 
that the investment would not have been made but for the advancement of the 
foundation’s charitable purposes. It is irrelevant whether the investment offers 
above-market, at-market, or below-market returns, or even whether it promises 
no return or great return, so long as (1) the investment’s primary goal is to advance 
the charitable purposes of the foundation, and (2) investors with a pure profi t 
motive would not invest on the same terms as the foundation. Similarly, it is 
irrelevant whether the investment consists of debt or equity, or whether the 
vehicle is an exempt organization or a for-profi t entity, so long as it provides 
a means whereby the foundation can advance its charitable purpose.
When a foundation wishes to make an investment that relates to its mission, 
does not promise risk-adjusted market returns as compared to other 
investments in the same asset class, and does not qualify as a PRI, careful 
consideration must be made as to whether the investment can be made 
within the confi nes of the jeopardy investment prohibition. We have found 
no explicit legal guidance on this issue. However, we reason that even where 
the proposed investment has a high risk/return profi le and the probability of 
loss is great, the investment will not constitute a jeopardy investment, subject 
to the following caveats: (1) the investment must advance the foundation’s 
exempt purposes, and (2) investment risk must be mitigated through 
portfolio diversifi cation or offset by the higher returns of other investments, 
such that the long-term purchasing power of the endowment as a whole is 
not materially impaired. In assessing the prudence of such an investment, the 
whole portfolio of the foundation must be considered. As a practical matter, 
thorough records of the investment committee’s deliberations should be kept, 
to evidence the care undergirding a decision to invest in these circumstances.
B. STATE FIDUCIARY LAWS
1. Introduction
While fi duciary standards applicable to private foundations vary from state 
to state, the prudent investor rule is now broadly recognized as the most 
relevant to investment decisions. As developed in the courts and set out 
in the treatise governing the law of trusts,90 the prudent investor rule is 
set forth in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (“UPIA”), which applies to 
trusts, and has developed over time through interpretation by the courts and 
through practice. The prudent investor rule has also been adopted by the 
new Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”) 
to apply to the management of the assets of charitable institutions, including 
foundations, organized as nonprofi t corporations.91 In those states in which 
it has already been adopted, UPMIFA supersedes the Uniform Management 
90 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2007). 
91 See discussion of UPMIFA infra Part I.B.2.
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of Institutional Funds Act (“UMIFA”), which like UPMIFA applies to 
charities organized as corporations. While UMIFA is gradually being 
displaced, it is important to clarify that the older uniform act relies on the 
business judgment rule in setting a standard for fi duciaries. This rule holds 
that a court will not question the decisions made by a fi duciary so long 
as they are made with due care and loyalty in the exercise of “business 
judgment.” The duties of care and loyalty also undergird the prudent investor 
rule, and UPMIFA views the prudent investor standard to be consistent with 
— if better articulated than — the business judgment rule’s application to 
charitable institutions.92 
The relevant statutes are discussed generally below, and a close analysis of 
California, New York and Oregon statutory laws, legislative history, and case 
law appears in Appendices E-G. On the whole, case law is not well-developed 
in this area. Consequently, statutory law provides the best source of guidance 
for practitioners. 
The law of fi duciary responsibility distinguishes between foundations 
deemed to have endowments and those foundations the assets of which are 
not so defi ned by the law. As a general matter, if a donor has specifi ed that 
the assets used to establish the foundation must not be spent down, but 
instead must be invested to produce return adequate to fund grantmaking 
activities, then a legally defi ned endowment arises, and its fi duciaries will be 
required to manage it in such a way as to protect its permanent character. 
The law will also presume that a donor intended to establish an endowment 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. However, if a foundation is not specifi ed 
by a donor or presumed by the law to constitute an endowment, then the 
institution may spend part or all of its assets down to advance its charitable 
purposes (the oft-invoked “if you can spend it, you can invest it” adage). 
It follows that a foundation that is not an endowment may invest any or 
all of its assets in mission-related investments.
2. Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional  
 Funds Act
Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA) is the most 
recent uniform act that governs the management of charitable funds. UPMIFA 
was adopted by 300 state law commissioners on July 13, 2006 at the annual 
meeting of the Uniform Law Commission, a national conference of lawyers 
that promulgates uniform laws.93 UPMIFA is in various stages of adoption by 
individual state legislatures.94
UPMIFA charts new territory in three major ways: fi rst, because it uses language 
from UPIA, it harmonizes the uniform standards of prudence for charitable 
organizations regardless of their legal form as a nonprofi t corporation or a trust. 
Second, UPMIFA sets out rules on spending from endowment funds intended by 
donors to have perpetual existence. And third, UPMIFA provides rules a charity, 
including a foundation, can use to alter a restriction imposed on a charitable 
donation. UPMIFA explicitly contemplates and accommodates mission investing 
in certain respects. A discussion of these provisions within UPMIFA’s overall 
standards follows. 
a. Standard of Prudence
In seeking to set out a prudence standard for all charitable organization 
fi duciaries to follow when making investment decisions, UPMIFA — while 
technically applicable only to nonprofi t corporations, and not to trusts — seeks to 
harmonize the standards for managing and investing charitable funds regardless 
of their corporate form. Accordingly, UPMIFA, unlike its predecessor UMIFA, 
incorporates the principles of trust law standards set out in the Uniform Prudent 
Investment Act (UPIA) relevant to charitable organizations. 
UPMIFA adopts a prudence standard for investment decision-making derived 
from the prudent investor rule of UPIA. Investments are not judged individually, 
but must be considered as part of the overall investment strategy of a portfolio 
— a central tenet of modern portfolio theory. UPMIFA clarifi es and elaborates 
on factors the fi duciaries of a charitable organization should consider in making 
investment decisions. 
92 See UPMIFA § 3 cmt.; Susan Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: the Uniform Prudent  
  Management of  Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REV. 1277, 1299-1300 & nn.131-140 (2007). 
93 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
94 As of September 21, 2008, 24 states and the District of Columbia had adopted UPMIFA (Alabama, Arizona,
  Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska,
  Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,   
  Virginia, and West Virginia), and six state legislatures were considering its adoption (California, Illinois,   
  Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and Vermont). UPMIFA, see 
  http://www.upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=68 (last visited September 21, 2008).
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Those relevant to mission investing include the following.
 • Donor intent governs, as expressed in the gift instrument;95
 • The charitable purposes of the institution must be given precedence;96
 • The duties of care and good faith must be exercised according to the
  standard that an “ordinarily prudent person in a like position would   
  exercise under similar circumstances97”, where “similar circumstances”   
  include the charitable context within which investment decisions   
  are to be made, thereby inserting a consideration beyond mere risk/  
  return analysis in determining the prudence of an investment decision.98
UPMIFA adopts UPIA’s prudent investor standard without deviation. The statute 
provides eight considerations to be factored into the prudent management and 
investment of institutional funds:
 • General economic conditions
 • Possible impact of infl ation or defl ation
 • Expected tax consequences
 • Role played by individual investments within the overall investment   
  portfolio
 • Expected total return from both income and appreciation
 • Other resources of the institution
 • Needs of the institution to make distributions and to preserve   
  capital, and
 • Any special relationship or value of an asset to the charitable 
  purposes of an institution.99
It is important to note that UPMIFA explicitly carves out program-related 
assets from its reach. Tracking the language of I.R.C. § 4944(c), such assets 
are defi ned as those “... held by an institution primarily to accomplish a 
charitable purpose of the institution and not primarily for investment.”100 
UPMIFA recognizes that these assets may be considered to be investments, 
but excludes them from the risk/return analysis that other investments 
must be subjected to as a matter of prudent decision-making. 
b. Endowment Spending and Preservation
Frequently those in favor of mission investing argue that if it is permissible to 
pay out one hundred percent of a foundation’s assets to advance its charitable 
purposes, then it follows that it is permissible to invest in accordance with 
those charitable purposes — even if such investments offer lower fi nancial 
returns and at the extreme, an erosion of the assets over the long term. In the 
case of foundations not intended by the donor to operate perpetually, this 
logic holds under the law. However, for a foundation deemed by law to give 
rise to an “endowment”, it is not permissible to invest in accordance with the 
foundations’s charitable purposes if the principal of the donor’s gift establishing 
the endowment is thereby eroded.
UPMIFA assumes that perpetual existence was intended unless a donor states 
otherwise. To override the uniform law’s presumption, the donor’s intent must 
be expressed in the gift instrument (defi ned as including all written documents, 
including electronic writings, under which a donor transfers property to a charity 
— including writings after the time of transfer, and excluding verbal expressions 
of intent).101 Specifi cally, UPMIFA presumes that the donor intended that the 
foundation’s assets would be managed in such a way as to produce adequate 
funds to distribute, while protecting the foundation’s permanent character. 
With the aim of preserving not only historic dollar value but the value of an 
endowment over time, UPMIFA articulates a spending rule based on the specifi c 
circumstances of the endowment fund and the charitable institution it supports, 
and emphasizing the “duration and preservation of the endowment fund.”102 
A donor may also override the law’s presumption of permanent existence in 
95 UPMIFA § 3(a).
96 Id.
97 UPMIFA § 3(b).
98 UPMIFA § 3(a) cmt.
99 UPMIFA  § 3(e)1.
  
100 UPMIFA § 2(7).
101 UPMIFA § 2(3).
102 UPMIFA § 4(a)(1). The term “purchasing power” is not used in the provisions of the Act, but is used in  
  its comments to express the importance of maintaining the value of the assets of the foundation over time  
  (historic value plus infl ation). By contrast, the technical meaning of “purchasing power” under accounting  
  standards implies correlation to an index, such as the Consumer Price Index; this meaning reportedly was  
  not intended by the Uniform Law Commission. Maintaining “purchasing power” in its technical sense may
  be impossible over time, and is not required by UPMIFA.
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the gift instrument by specifying, for example, that the foundation’s assets must 
be fully paid out within a certain number of years, or that a certain percentage of 
the historic value of the assets be paid out annually. Further, statutory law within 
a state that has adopted UPMIFA may alter the Act’s presumption, and careful 
analysis should be made of state-specifi c law before assuming that UPMIFA’s 
presumption will prevail.
If the legal presumption of permanent existence does hold, it is important to 
understand what it requires of a fi duciary. The Drafting Committee of UPMIFA 
discussed establishing a bright-line rule for annual payout to protect against 
overspending an endowment and thereby compromising its perpetual character, 
but did not agree that this was necessary. As a result, the text of the Act does not 
include such a rule, but instead provides an optional provision that individual 
legislatures may consider. This provision includes a presumption of imprudence 
if a charity spends more than seven percent of an endowment fund in any one 
year, based on a rolling average of the endowment’s market value during the 
three or more years immediately preceding the year in question.103 
The presumption may be rebutted by an endowment’s managers if circumstances 
in a particular year render expenditures beyond seven percent prudent, such as 
prior years of frugal payout.104 For example, in a year in which a foundation 
generates investment returns in excess of its target rate of return (adjusted 
for infl ation), and assuming that target were reasonable, we believe it would 
be prudent for it to exceed a seven percent payout. As noted by the Reporter 
to UPMIFA, “Public policy may favor increased spending for the public 
good…spending at an even higher rate [than the requisite fi ve percent] may be 
appropriate for a charity’s purposes and for the public good.”105 This limitation 
on spending poses an additional reason why foundations that seek to maximize 
their social impact should consider using their investments, in addition to their 
payout, to advance their charitable objectives.
3. Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act 
The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UMIFA”), 
promulgated in 1972, has been adopted by all the states and the District of 
Columbia, with the exception of Alaska and Pennsylvania.106 UMIFA itself 
modernized outdated (and highly conservative) fi duciary laws applicable 
to nonprofi t corporations. As noted above, UMIFA will be superseded by 
UPMIFA as individual state legislatures adopt the more recent uniform act. 
At the time of UMIFA’s enactment, charitable institutional funds were 
conservatively invested in bonds and fi xed-income instruments considered 
to provide a low-risk, low-return, and dependable income. UMIFA 
embraced total-return investing, which freed charitable institutions to invest 
in higher-return investments less subject to the effects of infl ation over time. 
UMIFA requires the boards of charitable institutions to invest endowment 
assets with care and prudence. UMIFA relies on the business judgment rule 
that derives from corporation law in setting a standard for fi duciary 
responsibility. This rule, which is consistent on the whole with the prudent 
investor standard, holds that a court will not second-guess a board’s decision-
making, as long as due care and prudence are employed. The standard set 
out requires consideration for “… the long- and short-term needs of the 
institution in carrying out its … charitable … purposes.”107 While UMIFA 
does not explicitly permit or prohibit mission investing, it does allow the board 
to consider the charitable purposes of the institution in making investment 
decisions. We conclude that UMIFA allows ample room for investing at or 
below market rate in advancement of a foundation’s mission.
103 UPMIFA § 4(d). For an authoritative drafting history of the Act, see Gary, supra note 92, at 1314 n.211  
  (for information on the optional provision). Prof. Gary served as the Reporter to the Drafting Committee  
  of  UPMIFA.
104 UPMIFA § 4 cmt.
105 Gary, supra note 92, at 1314 & n.212.
106 See Website of  the Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact_  
  factsheets/uniformacts-fs-umifa.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2008).
107 UMIFA § 6.
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4. Uniform Prudent Investor Act
The Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA), issued in 1994, governs the 
investment of private trust assets — not only charities (including foundations)  
organized as trusts. Unlike UMIFA, UPMIFA does not supersede UPIA. 
While UPIA’s provisions technically apply to foundations organized as trusts, 
its standards of prudence nonetheless may offer guidance to foundations 
organized as nonprofi t corporations. Those standards may also be found 
in other state laws governing trusts, as well as in the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts, the legal treatise that, in the absence of statutory and case law, 
provides guidance on principles of trust law. In any case, as noted above, 
UPMIFA incorporates the prudent investor standard of UPIA.
When UPIA was put forward in 1994, it sought to modernize the prudent 
investor standard by adopting a modern portfolio approach to investing 
trust assets. Investment decisions must be made with reasonable care,108 due 
loyalty,109 and within the context of the overall investment strategy of the 
portfolio.110 The diversifi cation of investments is required.111 Notably, risk 
and return objectives must be considered in light of their suitability for the 
individual trust.112 Further, the act requires a trustee to consider “all …
circumstances” relevant to the trust or its benefi ciaries in making investment 
and management decisions. Among the circumstances enumerated is an 
asset’s special relationship or value to the purposes of the trust or to 
its benefi ciaries.113 
This language is consistent with an interpretation that the mission of a 
charitable trust, and the sole interests of its benefi ciaries (in this context, 
those benefi ted by the foundation’s grantmaking), must be considered 
by the prudent trustee in making investment decisions. However, UPIA 
appears to challenge this interpretation explicitly in a comment to its 
provision imposing a duty of loyalty on a trustee, in which a trustee is 
required to “invest and manage the trust assets solely in the interest of 
the benefi ciaries.”114 The comment reads:
No form of so-called “social investing” is consistent with the 
duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrifi cing the 
interests of trust benefi ciaries — for example, by accepting 
below-market returns — in favor of the interests of the persons 
supposedly benefi ted by pursuing the particular social cause.115
This comment provides a gloss on the duty of loyalty and the fi duciary’s 
responsibility to act in the sole interests of the trust benefi ciaries, which 
is defi ned here exclusively as a matter of maximizing investment return. 
But clearly the duty of loyalty owed by a foundation trustee is distinct 
from that owed by the trustee of a private trust fl owing to the benefi t of 
an individual or group of individuals. Loyalty to the foundation must also 
take into consideration the charitable purposes of the trust.  
Accordingly, an investment by a charitable trust in an asset that delivers 
below-market returns should not violate the duty of loyalty under UPIA, 
so long as that investment advances the charitable purposes of the trust 
(and is taken with due care and prudence). In such a case, the confl ict 
anticipated by UPIA will not arise, and the trustee will not have acted 
disloyally. For example, if a charitable trust has as its exempt purpose the 
economic development of inner cities in the United States, a low-interest 108 UPIA § 2(a).
109 UPIA § 5.
110 UPIA § 2(b).
111 UPIA § 3.
112 UPIA § 2(b).
113 UPIA § 2(c)(8). The other general economic conditions include the possible effect of  infl ation or
   defl ation; the expected tax consequences of  investment decisions or strategies; the role that each
  investment or course of  action plays within the overall trust portfolio; the expected total return from
   income and the appreciation of  capital; other resources of  the benefi ciaries; and needs for
   liquidity, regularity of  income, and preservation or appreciation of  capital. UPIA § 2(c)(1)-(7).
114 UPIA § 5.
115 UPIA § 5 cmt. 4 (citing an article by the reporter to UPIA).
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loan to a local retail enterprise that targets inner-city entrepreneurs and 
consumers would constitute a below-market social investment, but it 
would not compromise the interests of the trust’s benefi ciaries. That 
said, the same trust would not act within the duty of loyalty if it were to 
invest in a below-market asset that fl owed to the benefi t of those beyond 
the scope of the trust’s charitable purpose. For example, if a foundation 
focused on animal rights in the United States were to make a low-interest 
loan to a microfi nance institution serving the rural poor of Haiti, it would 
violate the duty of loyalty. In that instance, the trust would forego income 
without benefi ting the trust’s defi ned benefi ciaries. 
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts grapples with this comment to UPIA’s 
section on the duty of loyalty in a discussion of the duty as it interplays 
with the prudent investor standard.116 Specifi cally with respect to investing 
for charitable trusts, the treatise states that “… social considerations 
may be taken into account in investing the funds of charitable trusts 
to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an expenditure of 
trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the extent the 
investment decision can be justifi ed on grounds of advancing, fi nancially 
or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust.”117 
In conclusion, while the duty of loyalty owed to a trust by its trustees 
applies broadly to all trusts, regardless of their benefi ciaries, the 
interpretation of the duty must be parsed according to who the 
benefi ciaries of a trust may be. The prohibition in UPIA against below-
market social investing clearly applies to non-charitable trusts, as 
distinguished from a charitable trust pursuing its charitable purposes 
through its investment activity. As noted by one leading scholar, 
“Traditionally, the view has been that the trustee’s duty relates only to 
the benefi ciaries’ fi nancial interests. Yet nothing in the duty of loyalty 
requires the trustee to exclude consideration of a benefi ciary’s non-
fi nancial interests.”118 Said another way, in making investment decisions, a 
charitable trustee may consider non-fi nancial considerations, including the 
charitable purposes of the foundation itself.
A state-specifi c analysis of current state fi duciary laws in each of California, 
New York, and Oregon and how they inter-relate with federal tax law 
relevant to mission investing in each of California, New York, and Oregon 
occurs at Appendices E-G. These case studies illustrate the complexity of 
the law, as well as its fl exibility in permitting mission investing. 
 
 
116 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. f  (2007), referring to § 90 cmt. c (2007).
117 Id.
118 Susan N. Gary, Is Mission Investing Prudent? (May 2008) (unpublished manuscript delivered on  
  May 8, 2008 to New York University School of  Law’s National Center on Philanthropy and the Law,  
  on fi le with author and FSG Social Impact Advisors).
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Part II:
Foundation Mission 
Investing in Practice
A.  FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY    
 REDEFINED
U.S. foundations range broadly in their interest in and use of mission 
investing as an additional tool to advance their philanthropy. A few pioneering 
foundations set out to harness their investments as a tool for advancing their 
missions more than a decade ago, and defi ned their fi duciary responsibility 
accordingly, such as the F.B. Heron Foundation and the Jessie Smith Noyes 
Foundation. Others pioneered forty years ago with the particular strategy 
of program-related investments. These included the Ford Foundation, soon 
followed by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the 
Packard Foundation. By contrast, many foundations continue to view their 
investment activity as entirely separate from their grantmaking. This wide 
spectrum of practice reveals the law’s fl exibility in permitting a variety of 
approaches to managing foundation assets. In fact, the legal defi nition of 
fi duciary responsibility continues to evolve as foundations recognize the 
opportunity to align their investment and grantmaking activity, and along 
with the market’s development of market-rate investment products that 
catalyze – or at least consider – environmental and social impact.
Prominent examples of private foundations with well-developed strategies 
for aligning investment and grantmaking activity illustrate the variety of 
approaches foundations take to mission investing. The F.B. Heron Foundation 
is a leader in the fi eld of mission investing both by example and by advocacy. 
Heron’s board determined in 1996 to harness the foundation’s investments 
to advance the charitable goals of asset building and community economic 
development. The board interpreted its fi duciary responsibility to require 
that it manage the foundation’s assets to maximize social impact, and not to 
maximize fi nancial performance alone. As former board chair William Dietel 
has written: “…mission stewardship challenges board members to do more 
than keep foundation assets from jeopardy. It asks board members to govern 
in a way that maximizes foundations’ overall effectiveness”119 Since 1996, the 
119 WILLIAM M. DIETEL, THE F.B. HERON FOUNDATION, MISSION STEWARDSHIP: ALIGNING  
  PROGRAMS, INVESTMENTS, AND ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVE IMPACT (2007), available at  
  http://www.fbheron.org/documents/ar.2006.viewbook_mission_stewardship.pdf.
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foundation has built its staff expertise and engagement in mission investing, 
as well as its commitment to serving as a leading advocate of mission 
investing.120 As of December 31, 2007, the foundation had an allocation of 
twenty-six percent of its assets to mission investments across the spectrum 
of asset classes, including program-related investments. Market-rate mission 
investments constituted eighteen percent of the foundation’s assets. The 
foundation anticipates increasing its allocation to mission investments to fi fty 
percent over time. 
 
As one example of Heron’s leadership, the foundation recently announced 
the launch of an index fund that screens for companies having a positive 
impact on community development in underserved areas across the United 
States. Having created the index for its proprietary use in 2004 in order to 
invest a portion of the foundation’s portfolio in companies serving low- and 
middle-income communities, Heron proved that it could achieve market-
rate returns by investing according to the index. With the aim of providing 
a product to the fi eld at large that would both achieve market-rate fi nancial 
returns and have positive social impact, the foundation announced in April 
2008 the launch of the U.S. Community Investing Index and the development 
of an exchange-traded security fund for the index. The index consists of 340 
companies out of the S&P 900’s universe.121 
Another indication of Heron’s commitment to mission investing and 
its leadership in the philanthropic arena occurred early in 2008, when 
Cambridge Associates, the pre-eminent investment consulting fi rm to the 
foundation fi eld, announced its launch of a mission-investing division with 
support from the Heron Foundation, Meyer Memorial Trust, and the 
Annie E. Casey Foundation. The signifi cance of this development cannot be 
overemphasized. Historically, many traditional investment consultants and 
investment advisors to foundations have been reluctant to advise their clients 
120 SOUTHERN NEW HAMPSHIRE UNIVERSITY, A CASE STUDY: EXPANDING PHILANTHROPY  
  – MISSION-RELATED INVESTING AT THE F.B. HERON FOUNDATION (2007), available at 
  http://www.fbheron.org/documents/snhu_heron_casestudy.pdf.
121 The Index is available under the ticker CMTYIDX.
on mission investing — product supply has been scarce, and investment 
results uncertain. The fact that the leading investment consultant to U.S. 
foundations has recognized the importance of mission investing and has 
strong client interest in such products signals the much broader acceptance of 
this approach to investing by foundations today.
The Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation determined to harmonize its 
investments thoroughly with its mission early in the 1990s, and interprets 
its fi duciary responsibility to require that it invest consistently with its 
grantmaking priorities.122 The foundation focuses on the environment and 
reproductive health. In order to invest proactively to advance its charitable 
purposes, the foundation established its own venture capital fund, the 
Blue Dot Fund, which invests in green technology and clean business 
strategies. Hedge fund investments are no longer made due to the lack of 
transparency. Legal concerns have never slowed it down in engaging in 
mission investing, which is consistent with the board’s determination that 
its fi duciary duties require it to invest in accordance with its charitable 
goals where possible. 
More recently, new energy has been infused into the mission investing 
fi eld by foundations seeking to leverage their investments to advance their 
charitable goals. For example, the W.K. Kellogg Foundation announced 
a $100 million allocation to mission investing in October 2007, with the 
goal of maximizing social return on its investments. A mix of market-rate 
and below market-rate investments (PRIs) is contemplated, while $75 
million of this amount will fund U.S.-based strategies and $25 million will 
fund African-based strategies consistent with the Kellogg Foundation’s 
grantmaking priorities. 
122 For details of  the Jessie Smith Noyes Foundation’s well-developed investment policy statement,  
  including its defi nition of  fi duciary responsibility, see http://www.noyes.org/investpol.html 
  (last visited July 31, 2008). 
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The Ford Foundation is the grandfather of PRI makers, having pioneered 
the use of PRIs in 1968 (the 1969 Tax Reform Act’s inclusion of the 
program-related investment exception responded to the Ford Foundation’s 
use of this novel investment approach). Now forty years later, the Ford 
Foundation has invested more than $400 million in PRIs to support the 
work of its grantees. The foundation caps interest rates on its loan PRIs at 
one percent, and may cap any equity investment profi ts as well, as a means 
of both supporting its investees and clearly evidencing that no intent to 
profi t from the PRI is present. 
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation has long had a strong 
commitment to program-related investments, having made its fi rst loan in 
1980 under its conservation program. The foundation primarily engages 
in PRIs with prior grantees, to ensure a close relationship with its PRI 
borrowers as a means of mitigating the risk of these investments. The 
foundation’s PRI budget is segregated out from its endowment assets, 
and is capped at three percent of assets. The foundation currently sets 
interest rates at below market on PRIs that take the form of loans, and 
as a result avoids concerns about qualifying its loan PRIs under the 
I.R.S.’ prohibition against income as a signifi cant purpose of a PRI. The 
foundation does not currently have any equity PRIs. 
Similarly, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has served 
the fi eld as a leader in deploying program-related investments to expand 
the impact of its grantmaking.123 Since 1983, MacArthur has invested 
$214 million in PRIs through loans to a variety of organizations working 
in the foundation’s programmatic areas, including women’s health, 
environmental conservation, education, and independent media.
123 See MacArthur Foundation, Human and Community Development: Program-Related Investments,  
  available at
   http://www.macfound.org/site/c.lkLXJ8MQKrH/b.948589/k.D3BA/Domestic_Grantmaking_Program_ 
  Related_Investments.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).
The Meyer Memorial Trust has a well-developed mission-related 
investment strategy, the centerpiece of which consists of program-related 
investments. Since beginning operations in 1982, the Meyer Memorial 
Trust has approved more than $27 million in debt and equity program-
related investments to support projects related to the charitable objectives 
of the trust, including Oregon-based economic development, affordable 
housing, environmental protection and the arts. The trust has also 
committed over $40 million cumulatively to risk-adjusted market rate 
mission investments since it commenced operations. In addition, the trust 
has become a national advocate for mission investing. Meyer has joined 
the Heron Foundation and the Anne E. Casey Foundation in spearheading 
the “2% Campaign”, which calls on foundations nationally to devote up 
to two percent of their assets to mission-related investments in an effort to 
create a national pool of $10 billion toward mission investing.
The Annie E. Casey Foundation implemented a Social Investment 
Program in 2002 that adopts three investment approaches to support the 
foundation’s grantmaking focus on vulnerable children and families. These 
approaches include mission-related deposits, program-related investments, 
and mission-related investments. The asset classes in which the foundation 
has invested include deposits, low-interest loans, guarantees, and private 
equity. With an inaugural allocation of $6 million, the Social Investment 
Portfolio was valued at over $42 million in commitments as of October 
2007. This represented approximately 1.3 percent of the foundation’s 
assets, which were valued at $3.326 billion as of December 31, 2007. In 
addition, the foundation has provided leadership to the philanthropic fi eld 
in its grantmaking to support the development of mission investing. The 
foundation reportedly has not encountered legal obstacles in establishing 
its social investing program.
In the case of a long-term investor such as a foundation, the 
environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) impact of corporate 
behavior arguably should be taken into account by the prudent fi duciary 
to the extent that this impact affects the long-term value, risk and return 
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of the investment.124 The Nathan Cummings Foundation, for example, 
has long interpreted its fi duciary responsibility to require that it engage 
in shareholder activism. In addition to voting its proxies actively, the 
foundation also fi les shareholder resolutions focusing on ESG issues as 
part of its approach to active ownership. Through fi ling shareholder 
resolutions and engaging in dialogues with the companies it owns, the 
foundation actively seeks to encourage the companies it invests in to 
consider the environmental and social impact of their activities on the 
basis that this refl ects good risk management. Negative screens other than 
tobacco activities are not employed. Investments in sustainable forestry 
strategies and LEED-certifi ed real estate have been made not as a matter 
of aligning investments with mission, but in the belief that these are good 
investments that will generate strong fi nancial returns. The KL Felicitas 
Foundation adds a fourth category into its sustainability considerations 
– “spiritual indicators” – when it considers investments.125 While this may 
strike some as ambiguous, the foundation has developed careful metrics 
to elaborate on its objectives and performance measurements in investing 
according to “ESGS” concerns. 
Many foundations – among them, large and prominent philanthropic 
institutions – continue to bifurcate their investment policy from their 
grantmaking priorities. In some cases, this split devolves from a conscious 
decision based on the philosophy that the social impact of investments 
is minimal when compared with the impact of grantmaking. It follows 
that they will then interpret their fi duciary responsibility as a matter of 
maximizing investment returns, the better to fuel the grantmaking budget. 
The more conservative of these foundations may assume a trade-off 
between return and social impact of an investment, while developments in 
the market may not continue to support that assumption. 
124 In 1995, a report issued by Freshfi elds Bruckhaus Deringer for the United Nations Environmental  
  Programme Finance Initiative concluded that, with respect to fi duciary duty under US law,
  “While there continues to be a debate about the exact parameters of  the duty, there appears to
  be a consensus that, so long as ESG considerations are assessed within the context of  a
  prudent investment plan, ESG considerations can (and, where they affect estimates of  value,
  risk and return, should) form part of  the investment decision-making process.” FRESHFIELDS
  BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL,
   SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 114 (2005), available at 
  http://www.unepfi .org/fi leadmin/documents/freshfi elds_legal_resp_20051123.pdf. 
125 For details on the Felicitas Foundation’s mission investment policies, see 
  http://www.klfelicitasfoundation.org/work/invest_strat/index.php (last visited July 31, 2008). 
And even one of the most visible adherents to this philosophy — The 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation — screens its investment portfolio for 
tobacco, and engages in program-related investments. 
Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation, which has historically taken a 
conservative approach to its investment activity, screens out investments in 
companies “whose primary activity is related to tobacco.” The foundation 
also invests in companies that have “social value” that may advance its 
grantmaking priorities (such as renewable energy and sustainable forestry 
practices), and engages in program-related investments.126 
Other foundations hesitate to engage in mission investing out of a concern 
that it is overly complicated. Mapping out an investment policy that 
includes not only risk and return analysis, but also an analysis of social 
impact, may invite a host of complexities that foundation staff and boards 
may hesitate to assume. Still others bump up against the complexities of 
negotiating PRIs and determine that they lack the skill at the staff level to 
engage in the diffi cult and frequently expensive process of structuring a 
transaction. One strategy to offset the expense associated with negotiating 
PRI documentation is to develop standardized documentation that can 
be used deal after deal with only modest modifi cations tailored to specifi c 
transactions. Both the Heron Foundation and the Packard Foundation 
have adopted this approach.
With respect to payout and its implications for mission investing, 
foundations have the legal authority to spend down their assets over 
time if this authority is provided in their constitutive documents, or if 
statutory law does not otherwise deem that the donor intended to create 
a permanent vehicle. An analysis of the articles of incorporation or the 
trust instrument will inform the foundation as to whether or not such a 
provision was included. Some high-profi le foundations have determined 
126 The Rockefeller Foundation has issued a set of  “Social Investing Guidelines” that stops short of   
  committing the foundation to any particular policy, but notes that the foundation may use positive
  and negative social screens, and engage in proxy voting. THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, 
  SOCIAL INVESTING GUIDELINES, available at 
  http://www.rockfound.org/about_us/social_investing_guidelines.pdf  (last visited date). 
  See also Charles Piller, Foundations Align Investments with Their Charitable Goals, L.A. TIMES, 
  Dec. 29, 2007, at C1.
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to spend down over a fi xed amount of time, such as the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Atlantic Philanthropies, and the Belden Fund. This 
determination may be driven by a founder’s desire to avoid establishing 
a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, by a sense of urgency about addressing 
contemporary social ills, or by other impulses. Such a foundation has full 
latitude under the law to invest in accordance with its mission, regardless of 
whether fi nancial returns are maximized.
 
B.  EMERGING PRACTICES IN PHILANTHROPY:  
 SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
While we believe that foundations can make a powerful contribution 
toward social impact through their investing, we also recognize that private 
enterprise is increasingly called on to advance traditionally philanthropic 
objectives. Side by side with the rapid development of mission investing 
vehicles, entrepreneurial philanthropists may have limited patience for the 
confi nes of the federal tax laws on foundations with respect to for-profi t 
activities. The development of the Omidyar Network, with both a traditional 
foundation and a for-profi t company that invests in “double bottom line” 
strategies, exemplifi es a new form of philanthropy that seeks to harness 
the discipline and rigor of the private sector to advance social change by 
investing in for-profi t entrepreneurships having social intentions. The 
Rockdale Foundation, a funder of microfi nance institutions and strategies, 
is embedded in a similar “network” of vehicles that deploy both traditional 
philanthropic solutions and more innovative social investment solutions 
to address global poverty. The Rockdale Foundation’s grantmaking has 
a symbiotic relationship with the investment activity of its affi liate Gray 
Matters, a for-profi t company that invests in social enterprises targeting 
the bottom of the pyramid. 
Foundations can support these emerging philanthropic forms and 
activities through both their investment and their grantmaking activities. 
The Mannweiler Foundation, for example, supported a project to 
develop a new legal form known as the L3C, or low-profi t limited 
liability corporation, designed to ease the legal complexities of investing 
in program-related investments.127 The Rockefeller Foundation has 
developed a social fi nancing grantmaking program to catalyze private 
sector solutions to social problems globally.128 A more recently established 
foundation, KL Felicitas, takes an entrepreneurial approach to its 
philanthropy in focusing on supporting social enterprises around the 
world. Its commitment to harnessing sustainable economic solutions to 
address social problems permeates its investment policy, which is closely 
aligned with its philanthropic goals. 
While our legal system is designed to embrace change slowly and 
cautiously, practice chafes against its conservatism and insists on moving 
forward with new solutions. As practice evolves, so, too, eventually does 
the law. The philanthropic fi eld can look forward with confi dence to new 
and emerging practices that insist on the link between philanthropy and 
the private sector. Mission investing provides one effective expression of 
that link. 
 
   
127 Legislation adopting the L3C as a new corporate form entered into force in Vermont on April 30,  
  2008. H. 775, 2008 Gen. Assem. (Vt. 2008). 
128 The Impact Investing work of  the Rockefeller Foundation works to integrate program-related  
  investing into the grantmaking of  the foundation, build intermediation in the fi eld, and foster  
  the mission investing fi eld generally. 
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Part III:
Recommendations
Now almost forty years after the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the time is ripe to 
modernize federal tax laws relevant to investing foundation assets.  Similarly, 
state laws could be clarifi ed to permit mission investing explicitly, rather than 
implicitly. But even without changes to the relevant laws and guidance issued 
under them, donors and foundation boards can take practical steps to ensure 
that their investment policies fulfi ll their charitable objectives, while complying 
with the law. 
A. LEGAL CLARIFICATION
Greater clarity in the law would ease the compliance burden of mission investing 
on foundation staff, trustees, and legal and tax regulators, without compromising 
the policy objectives underlying legal restrictions on fi duciaries to ensure that 
tax-exempt dollars are well-deployed for charitable purposes. The following 
suggestions map some ways in which the law could be effectively clarifi ed. 
1. Federal Tax Law
The confusion encountered by foundations seeking to invest within the 
parameters of the prohibition against jeopardy investments and its program-
related exception is evidenced by the more than one thousand requests for 
private letter rulings interpreting § 4944 of the I.R.C. We must assume that 
for every foundation that makes the effort to seek legal clarifi cation through a 
private letter ruling, many other foundations are deterred from doing so by the 
expense and delays involved.  Others may elect to  take the legal risk of engaging 
in mission investing without the comfort of clarity that their investment is fully 
in compliance with federal tax law. Over one hundred of these have sought 
substantive guidance on program-related investment qualifi cation. This burden 
encompasses the legal expenses incurred by those foundations requesting 
guidance, or in some cases, the charitable institutions receiving program-
related investments from them;129 and the delays incurred in implementing an 
investment strategy or – in the worst case – foregoing an investment opportunity 
that would advance the foundation’s charitable purpose; and staff time that 
might be better allocated if the law were clearer. The burden on the I.R.S. in 
responding to requests for private letter rulings must also be considered. 
129 Foundations frequently request that the charitable institution in which they will invest through a PRI  
  bear the legal burden of  preparing documentation and obtaining a private letter ruling.
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130 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
131 Some scholars and practitioners have called for a repeal of  I.R.C. § 4944 as unduly burdensome.  
See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, SRI – Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing, That Is), 42  
 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755 (2008); Schmalbeck, supra note 20, at 108. 
132 Schmalbeck, supra note 21, at 109.
Legal clarifi cation of § 4944 would ease the interpretive task faced by a 
foundation when contemplating a program-related investment that does not 
fall squarely within one of the examples issued in 1972. The I.R.S.’ 
consideration of publishing new examples under both the jeopardizing 
investment prohibition and the program-related investment exception (as 
requested by the American Bar Association and the Council on Foundations) 
heralds one approach to modernizing and clarifying the law that would require 
limited intervention. This would require no legislative action, and would clarify 
what the I.R.S. considers to be permissible investment activity. It would be 
immensely helpful to the compliance burden foundations face in determining 
whether a particular investment will qualify as a PRI if the I.R.S. were to act 
on this request and more modern examples were issued. 
For example, the guidance on what qualifi es as a charitable purpose for a 
housing PRI130 is now more than a decade old, and social policy has long 
outpaced its defi nitions. We have learned in the interim that successful housing 
development projects incorporate mixed-income residents, including middle-
income residents, yet the guidance has not been updated to refl ect contemporary 
housing policy. The result is that foundations seeking to make impactful 
program-related investments in this fi eld must either act beyond the scope of 
the guidance, and risk regulatory penalty, or seek a private letter ruling on 
each individual investment they seek to make, causing delays that may result 
in missed opportunities to support worthy projects, or worse, the collapse of 
projects altogether for lack of capital.
Some have suggested that § 4944 be abolished altogether.131 Given that fi duciary 
principles of good faith and investment prudence imposed on foundations by 
individual state law would continue to apply, it has been argued that § 4944 of 
the I.R.C. adds little protection above and beyond that of state law. And, as noted 
by one legal scholar, the I.R.S. would still retain the authority to withdraw a 
foundation’s exempt status in a case of abuse if it determined that the foundation 
had acted beyond the scope of its charitable purposes.132 
However, abolition of § 4944 would also remove the safe harbor of 
the program-related investment, which has been imported into the 
laws of most states. Unless it were preserved in the I.R.C. otherwise, 
this would remove a useful tool that foundations have to support 
investment strategies that advance their social impact. Further, the 
limited enforcement capacity of the state attorneys general argues against 
removing this federal oversight tool. Moreover, the current environment in 
the U.S. Senate and at the I.R.S. is unfavorable to relinquishing oversight 
authority over private foundations generally. Confused (and confusing) 
as the law may be, the current concern for abuses of charitable vehicles 
expressed by the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and 
Means Committee133 indicates that the time is not ripe for repeal. 
2. State Law
Ideally, state laws governing the investment of foundation assets would 
be amended to permit mission investing clearly and explicitly. A uniform 
law — or, incrementally, individual state laws — that explicitly permits 
foundation boards to consider not only risk and return, but also an 
investment’s impact on a foundation’s charitable objectives, would help 
to clear the legal haze around mission investing. While a close parsing 
of UPMIFA and UPIA permit a reasoned conclusion that they permit 
mission investing, greater certainty would be achieved by a provision that 
set out clearly that mission investing is permissible within a framework 
of prudent investment. Such legislation would not invalidate the careful 
work surrounding the prudent investor standard that has developed 
over decades, but would add an explicit recognition of non-fi nancial 
considerations within the broader context of fi duciary responsibility. 
This change would also have the benefi t of bringing state law into accord 
with the increasingly popular practice of considering the social impact of 
foundation investments.
133 The Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee have both sought in
 recent years to extend federal regulation of  nonprofi t entities, including private foundations.Two
 recent concrete results of  the efforts relevant to foundations include an overhaul of  Form 990-PF,
 and the enactment of  the Pension Protection Act of  2006. 
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B.  FOUNDATION INVESTMENT    
 PRACTICES AND POLICIES
While foundations continue to navigate current law, donors wishing their 
philanthropic vehicles to engage in mission investing can provide explicit 
guidance to boards overseeing those foundations. By doing so, donors can 
position foundation boards to harness their investments to advance their 
social impact, while navigating the fi duciary and tax laws as effi ciently 
as possible. 
Given the deference paid by state fi duciary laws to the expressed intent 
of a donor, a key opportunity for facilitating the implementation of 
a foundation’s investment policies occurs at the stage of drafting a 
foundation’s constitutive documents. If a donor wants the foundation 
to align its investments with its charitable purposes, she can express 
this in writing. Such a statement might authorize trustees or directors 
to take social and environmental considerations into account in making 
investment decisions, or if the donor is so inclined, might require them to 
do so. The donor might also specify whether and to what extent fi nancial 
returns may be sacrifi ced to serve mission objectives, and whether tools 
such as screening, proactive investments, or shareholder advocacy are 
authorized or encouraged. 
Similarly, if the donor does not wish the foundation to exist in perpetuity 
– the default position of state fi duciary laws – she can set out this intent 
in specifi c terms (number of years in which the foundation must spend its 
assets, or a percentage pay-out per year) or merely contradict the law’s 
presumption that she is creating an endowment (no intention of perpetual 
existence). Clearly, the greater the detail provided in the constitutive 
documents, the clearer the board and staff of the foundation will be as to 
what they must and can do to fulfi ll the donor’s intent. 
Best practices require a foundation board to develop a written investment 
policy statement to set the context within which investment decisions 
will be made. An investment policy statement should accomplish the 
following objectives:
 • describe the investment goals, the required rate of return, and
  the target rate of return for the foundation’s assets; 
 • describe an appropriate risk posture for the investment of the  
  foundation’s assets;
 • establish investment guidelines regarding the diversifi cation of  
  assets and selection of investment managers; and
 • specify the criteria for evaluating the performance of the   
  investment managers and the portfolio as a whole.
An investment policy statement for a foundation that seeks to align its 
investments with its charitable purposes may specify, for example,
 • that certain defi ned corporate activities will not be invested in  
  (for example, a foundation that has as its charitable purpose  
  combating climate change might wish to avoid investing in   
  extractive industries); 
 • that certain defi ned corporate activities tied to the charitable  
  purposes of the foundation will be sought out for investment  
  across all asset classes, or within defi ned asset classes;
 • any relevant guidelines for the selection and evaluation of   
  investment managers; 
 • that program-related investments will be sought out either   
  generally or at a targeted percentage of the foundation’s assets.
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In the case in which a foundation cannot, or chooses not, to spend 
down, and must abide by the legal restriction to manage investment 
assets to maintain its historical value or its value over time, investment 
decisions must be made to achieve returns suffi cient to generate adequate 
grantmaking resources. Given the potential presumption that spend-out of 
more than seven percent is imprudent, a foundation may wish to address 
the use of excess investment returns by establishing a special provision for 
their payout in its investment policy statement. 
An example of an investment policy statement for a foundation seeking to 
engage in mission investing is provided at Appendix H. 
Lastly, and specifi c to program-related investments, a foundation should 
be careful to record the due diligence it exercises in determining to make 
such an investment. The board minutes recording authorization of a 
program-related investment should spell out the close relationship between 
the charitable purposes of the foundation and the investment, and the 
conclusion that the fi nancial return on the investment did not constitute a 
signifi cant purpose of the investment at the time the board determined to 
make it. 
 
Part IV:
Conclusion
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134 As early as 1997, the argument was made by exempt organizations counsel Bill McKeown that
 “In order to fulfi ll their responsibility to see that the corporation [foundations organized as nonprofi t
 corporations and other nonprofi t organizations] meets its charitable purposes, [fi duciaries] may 
 have a duty to consider whether their investment decisions will further those charitable purposes, 
 or at least not run counter to them.” William B. McKeown, On Being True to Your Mission: Social 
 Investments for Endowments, 6 J. OF INVESTING 71, 71-78 (1997). That assertion can be rooted no
 more affi rmatively than in the conditional tense now than it was a decade ago, if  one is limited 
 to a strict interpretation of  the law. Practice, however, is another matter. See also United Nations 
 Environmental Programme Finance Initiative supra note125 (espousing a value-driven investment
 theory consistent with our analysis).
Current law provides ample room permitting foundation fi duciaries to 
consider not only fundamental concerns for risk and return, but also the 
impact of the investment on the charitable purposes of the foundation. 
As rapidly as the practice of mission investing grows and new investment 
vehicles develop, pioneering foundations increasingly adopt a defi nition 
of fi duciary responsibility that includes not only consideration for the 
risk and return of a foundation’s investments, but also for whether those 
investments are consistent with the foundation’s charitable mission. This 
defi nition of prudent investment is well-grounded in practice, and is 
permissible – although not yet required – under relevant laws. Historically 
in the U.S. common law system, practice pulls the law reluctantly toward 
modernization. The law pertaining to investment practices – and more 
specifi cally, to mission investing by U.S. foundations – is no exception. 
While we do not believe that the law currently supports any statement 
stronger than that mission investing is permissible, we note that best 
practices in foundation investing are rapidly evolving. Increasingly 
foundation boards believe that they have a practical obligation — if 
not yet a legal one — , as well as an opportunity, to consider not only 
the expected risk and return of a foundation’s investments, but also 
the potential impact of those investments to advance (or corrode) a 
foundation’s charitable mission. 
And fi nally, we note that fi duciary duty is grounded in normative practice. 
As more and more foundations engage in mission investing, the defi nition 
of prudent investment — embedded as the legal concept of “prudence” is 
in the reality of common practice — may well cross the line from merely 
allowing to eventually requiring the good fi duciary to consider risk, return 
and alignment with a foundation’s charitable mission.134
Appendix A
Examples of Jeopardizing and Non-Jeopardizing 
Investments as set out in Internal Revenue Manual 
Private Foundations Handbook (04-30-1998) 
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Example 1: 
A is a foundation manager of B, a private foundation with assets of 
$100,000. A approves the following three investments by B after taking 
into account with respect to each of them B’s portfolio as a whole, an 
investment of: 
$5,000 in the common stock of corporation X 
$10,000 in the common stock of corporation Y 
$8,000 in the common stock of corporation Z
Corporation X has been in business a considerable time, its record of 
earnings is good, and there is no reason to anticipate a diminution of its 
earnings. Corporation Y has a promising product, has had earnings in 
some years and substantial losses in others, has never paid a dividend, 
and is widely reported in investment advisory services as seriously 
undercapitalized. Corporation Z has been in business a short period of 
time and manufactures a product that is new, is not sold by others, and 
must compete with a well-established alternative product that serves the 
same purpose. Z’s stock is classifi ed as a high-risk investment by most 
investment advisory services with the possibility of substantial long-term 
appreciation but with little prospect of a current return. A has studied the 
records of the three corporations and knows the foregoing facts. In each 
case the price per share of common stock purchased by B is favorable to B. 
Under the standards of Reg. 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i), the investment of $10,000 
in the common stock of Y and the investment of $8,000 in the common 
stock of Z may be classifi ed as jeopardizing investments, while the 
investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X will not be so classifi ed. 
Example 2: 
Assume the facts of Example 1, except that in the case of: (a) corporation 
Y, B’s investment will be made for new stock to be issued by Y; and there 
is reason to anticipate that B’s investment, together with investments 
required by B to be made concurrently with its own, will satisfy the 
capital needs of corporation Y and will thereby overcome the diffi culties 
that have resulted in Y’s uneven earnings record; and (b) corporation 
Z, the management has a demonstrated capacity for getting new 
businesses started successfully and Z has received substantial orders 
for its new product. Under the standards of Reg. 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i), 
neither the investment in Y nor the investment in Z will be classifi ed as a 
jeopardizing investment. 
Example 3: 
D is a foundation manager of E, a private foundation with assets of 
$200,000. D was hired by E to manage E’s investments after a careful 
review of D’s training, experience, and record in the fi eld of investment 
management and advice indicated to E that D was well qualifi ed to 
provide professional investment advice in the management of E’s 
investment assets. D, after careful research into how best to diversify E’s 
investments, in order to provide for E’s long-term fi nancial needs, and to 
protect E against the effects of long-term infl ation, decided to allocate a 
portion of E’s investment assets to unimproved real estate in selected areas 
of the country where population patterns and economic factors strongly 
indicate continuing growth at a rapid rate. D determines that the short-
term fi nancial needs of E can be met through E’s other investments. Under 
the standards of Reg. 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i), the investment of a portion of 
E’s investment assets in unimproved real estate will not be classifi ed as a 
jeopardizing investment. See Reg. 53.4944–1(c). 
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Example 4: 
A private foundation received a donation of a whole-life insurance policy. 
At the time of the donation, the policy was subject to a policy loan that 
the insurer had made to the donor. The policy provided that, upon the 
death of the insured, the foundation would receive insurance proceeds 
in an amount equal to the face value of the policy reduced by the sum of 
the outstanding principal of the loans and any unpaid interest thereon. 
At the time the policy was donated, the life expectancy of the insured 
donor was 10 years. Instead of immediately surrendering the policy 
to the insurer for its cash surrender value, the foundation retained the 
policy as an investment and annually pays the premiums and interest due 
on the policy and the policy loan, respectively. The combined premium 
and interest payments are of such an amount that, by the end of eight 
years, the foundation will have invested a greater amount in premiums 
and interest than it could receive as a return on this investment, i.e., in 
the form of insurance proceeds upon the death of the insured. Thus, the 
insurance policy will produce a fi nancial loss to the foundation at the 
end of eight years. Under the facts and circumstances, the foundation 
managers, by investing at the projected rate of return prevailing at the 
time of the investment, failed to exercise ordinary business care and 
prudence in providing for the long-term and short-term fi nancial needs of 
the foundation in carrying out its exempt purposes. Thus, each payment 
made by the private foundation for a premium on the insurance policy and 
the interest on the policy loan is a jeopardizing investment. See Rev. Rul. 
80–133, 1980–1 C.B. 258. 
Example 5: 
The manager of a private foundation invested the entire corpus of the 
foundation in a foreign bank without inquiring into the integrity of the 
banks. The manager did not know that the bank’s license to do business 
and its charter had been revoked. Interest payments received by the 
foundation were irregular. The Tax Court agreed with the I.R.S. that the 
investment was a jeopardizing investment. See Thorne v. Commissioner, 
99 T.C. 67 (1992). See IRM 7.27.18.6.2.2 for a discussion of advice 
of legal or qualifi ed investment counsel; and IRM 7.27.18.6.2.6 for 
additional examples of the application of fi rst-tier taxes. 
 
Appendix B
Program-Related Investments by Asset Class, as 
Approved by Private Letter Rulings
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Loan Investments: 
200331006: loan to housing development held PRI 
200331007: loan to housing development held PRI 
200331005: loan to housing development held PRI
200331008: loan to housing development held PRI
200034037: loan to help open media in formerly closed societies held PRI
199943058: loans to foreign government for economic development and loans to induce 
businesses to operate in country held PRI 
9608039: loan to for-profi t corporation for fi nding cure for disease held PRI 
9551005: loans to media in formerly closed societies held held PRI
9434031: loans to exempt organizations serving needs of handicapped children held held PRI 
9148052: loan to partnership to redevelop property for apartments in blighted area of city for 
elderly/low-income held PRI
9134031: loan to holding company that owns bank that serves minorities held PRI 
9134030: same as 9134031 
9112013: loan to partnership for housing project for low income in blighted area held PRI
9016078: loan to community organization for low-income housing held PRI
8943022: loan to pooled-risk fund to provide liability insurance to member agencies (tax-
exempt organizations) held PRI
8923071: loan to partnership for low-income housing held PRI 
8923070: loan for residential/commercial units in blighted area held PRI 
8910027: loan to exempt organization to provide housing loans held PRI 
8832058: loans to low-income young married couples for housing held PRI 
8821087: purchase of bonds in exempt organization to provide interest-free mortgage loans to 
persons in area that have no more than 60 percent of median family income held PRI
8810026: loan to insurance fund that covers member tax-exempt organizations held PRI
8733043: loans to private colleges held PRI
8728053: loan to construct/equip research center for benefi t of U.S. government held PRI 
8708067: loan to exempt organization to create endowment in connection with research center 
re: environment/use of global resources held PRI
8547084: deposits to loan program managed by for-profi t company that provides housing 
loans to low-income persons and fi nancing to nonprofi t developers of low-income housing 
held PRI 
8445097: loans to exempt organizations to meet communication needs of exempt 
organizations held PRI
8445096: same as 8445097
8430082: loan for urban redevelopment and residential units to partnership held PRI 
8429069: loan to exempt organization to renovate school held PRI
8426066: grants/loans to mature, indigent artists held PRI
8313105: loans/grants for historical preservation held PRI
8313104: same as 8313105
8313103: same as 8313105
8310090: loan to revolving fund to help cash-fl ow of charities held PRI
8301110: loan to partnership to construct hotel in blighted area held PRI 
8242068: loan to partnership to construct hotel in blighted area held PRI 
8234056: loans to charities held PRI
8225073: loan to partnership to construct hotel in blighted area held held PRI
8223046: same as 8225073
8221052: same as 8225073 
8220060: same as 8225073 
8245001: same as 8225073 
8209027: loans to exempt organizations held PRI 
8141025: loan to fund that provides fi nancing to rehabilitate certain properties that serve 
the public interest held PRI
8139068: loan to exempt organization to combat community deterioration held PRI 
8136080: loan to partnership to construct hotel in blighted area held PRI
8126092: grants/loans to indigent persons for necessities held PRI
8121167: loan to organization for preservation of landmarks held PRI
8030079: loan to entity for public redevelopment purposes held PRI 
8025068: loan to help fi nance construction of family health center held PRI
Credit Enhancement
200043050: loan guaranty and interest rate subsidy to assist with fi nancing of child-care 
facilities held PRI
9148049: private foundation’s guaranty of bonds for purposes of downtown rehabilitation 
held PRI
9852023: obligation to indemnify or fund and pay malpractice and other liabilities prior to 
merger of medical centers held PRI
8105112: redevelopment program in city by assisting private developers to obtain fi nancing 
to rehabilitate property; private foundation would provide indemnifi cation/security on loans 
held PRI
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Equity Investments:
200610020: equity in fund that invested in business in low-income communities held PRI  
200343028: equity investment in farm management that focused on advanced agricultural 
methods and demonstration of methods held PRI
200343027: same as 200343028 
200246036: equity in construction of buildings on area to be rented to church held PRI
200148078: acquisition of stock in intermediary between private foundation and 
pharmaceutical industry held PRI
200136026: equity investment in for-profi t entity to fi nance environmentally oriented 
businesses (venture capital) held PRI
199950039: contribution by foundation to an LLC to perform services (operation/
maintenance) in connection to lands that had environmental/conservation value and leased 
by foundation held PRI
199943044: acquisition of stock in company, which capital in turn would be used to 
encourage creation of jobs and economic development held PRI
199910066: equity investment in partnership to create/support new businesses, including 
high-tech ventures, held PRI 
9834033: acquisition of interest in LLC for family support center purposes held PRI
9826048: fi nancial and technical services by private foundation to businesses in areas of 
world economically deprived held PRI
9537035: equity contribution to community foundation for acquisition of stock in Major 
League Baseball club held PRI
9530025: same as 95337035
9449022: equity in museum held PRI 
9111035: acquisition of stock in company that provides education experiences to children 
held PRI
9014063: equity in fund that will assist media hit by terrorism held PRI
8807048: purchase of holding in entity that makes investments in business mainly in 
depressed areas and for economic development held PRI 
8710076: equity investment in exempt organization to purchase limited partnership interest 
(with focus on privatization of human services) held PRI 
8704046: equity in structures surrounding museum for purposes of repair after storm 
damage held PRI
8628080: equity in reserve, which contains arboretum, and construction of visitors center 
held PRI
8549039: purchase of stock in for-profi t company for purpose of economic development 
held PRI 
8526084: purchase of stock in small business investment corporation (SBIC) for economic 
development held PRI
8332072: museum/land devised by will; equity investment in building structures on land 
held PRI 
8101009: investment in subsidiary that will plan, develop, and manage housing and social 
welfare services in a national energy demonstration project that focuses on maximum 
conservation of energy with a low-income housing component (20 percent of units) held PRI
7813108: purchase of stock in bank that serves minority businesses that cannot obtain 
funding through traditional sources held PRI
Real Estate Investments:
199906053: acquisition of city block for rejuvenation purposes and use by public held PRI
199933051: proposed acquisition of land and construction of buildings for use by church 
held PRI
9426044: acquire and maintain land that is ecologically signifi cant held PRI
9226073: acquire property that has retreat, retirement home, Alzheimer’s treatment center and 
will be leased to exempt organization held PRI
9033063: purchase of land and construction of museum held PRI 
8906062: lease land with cattle to exempt organization for research held PRI
8842067: ownership and operation of ecological area run like state park held PRI
8832074: purchase of land for conservation purposes held PRI
8803060: purchase of building to use as HQ and lease space to other exempt organizations 
held PRI
8531031: repair of storm damage to museum/area held PRI
8216087: purchase structure to be used as HQ and rented space to other exempt orgs 
held PRI
8150053: same as 8150052
8150052: purchase of island for purpose of conservation activities held PRI
8144060: same as 8150052, 815053
8110049: construction of build-outs on art gallery/library held PRI
7842052: creation of outdoor sculpture park held PRI 
7823072: equity investment in large housing project for mixed population held PRI
7804107: construction of school buildings that would later be bought by school held PRI 
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Appendix C
Program-Related Investment Examples under 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b)
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b): Examples 
Example 1:
X is a small business enterprise located in a deteriorated urban area and 
owned by members of an economically disadvantaged minority group. 
Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds 
to X on terms it considers economically feasible. Y, a private foundation, 
makes a loan to X bearing interest below the market rate for commercial 
loans of comparable risk. Y’s primary purpose for making the loan is 
to encourage the economic development of such minority groups. The 
loan has no signifi cant purpose involving the production of income 
or the appreciation of property. The loan signifi cantly furthers the 
accomplishment of Y’s exempt activities and would not have been made 
but for such relationship between the loan and Y’s exempt activities. 
Accordingly, the loan is a program-related investment even though Y may 
earn income from the investment in an amount comparable to or higher 
than earnings from conventional portfolio investments.
Example 2:
Assume the facts as stated in Example 1, except that after the date of 
execution of the loan Y extends the due date of the loan. The extension is 
granted in order to permit X to achieve greater fi nancial stability before it 
is required to repay the loan. Since the change in the terms of the loan is 
made primarily for exempt purposes and not for any signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or the appreciation of property, the 
loan shall continue to qualify as a program-related investment.
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Example 3: 
X is a small business enterprise located in a deteriorated urban area and 
owned by members of an economically disadvantaged minority group. 
Conventional sources of funds are unwilling to provide funds to X at 
reasonable interest rates unless it increases the amount of its equity capital. 
Consequently, Y, a private foundation, purchases shares of X’s common 
stock. Y’s primary purpose in purchasing the stock is to encourage the 
economic development of such minority group, and no signifi cant purpose 
involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The 
investment signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of Y’s exempt 
activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between 
the investment and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, the purchase of the 
common stock is a program-related investment, even though Y may realize 
a profi t if X is successful and the common stock appreciates in value.
Example 4: 
X is a business enterprise which is not owned by low-income persons or 
minority group members, but the continued operation of X is important 
to the economic well-being of a deteriorated urban area because X 
employs a substantial number of low-income persons from such an area. 
Conventional sources of funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds 
to X at reasonable interest rates. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan 
to X at an interest rate below the market rate for commercial loans of 
comparable risk. The loan is made pursuant to a program run by Y to 
assist low-income persons by providing increased economic opportunities 
and to prevent community deterioration. No signifi cant purpose of the 
loan involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. 
The investment signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of Y’s exempt 
activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between 
the loan and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-
related investment.
Example 5: 
X is a business enterprise which is fi nancially secure and the stock of 
which is listed and traded on a national exchange. Y, a private foundation, 
makes a loan to X at an interest rate below the market rate in order to 
induce X to establish a new plant in a deteriorated urban area which, 
because of the high risks involved, X would be unwilling to establish absent 
such inducement. The loan is made pursuant to a program run by Y to 
enhance the economic development of the area by, for example, providing 
employment opportunities for low-income persons at the new plant, and no 
signifi cant purpose involves the production of income or the appreciation 
of property. The loan signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of Y’s 
exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the loan and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, even though X is 
large and established, the investment is program-related.
Example 6: 
X is a business enterprise which is owned by a nonprofi t community 
development corporation. When fully operational, X will market agricultural 
products, thereby providing a marketing outlet for low-income farmers in 
a depressed rural area. Y, a private foundation, makes a loan to X bearing 
interest at a rate less than the rate charged by fi nancial institutions which 
have agreed to lend funds to X if Y makes the loan. The loan is made 
pursuant to a program run by Y to encourage economic redevelopment 
of depressed areas, and no signifi cant purpose involves the production of 
income or the appreciation of property. The loan signifi cantly furthers the 
accomplishment of Y’s exempt activities and would not have been made but 
for such relationship between the loan and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, 
the loan is a program-related investment.
Example 7: 
X, a private foundation, invests $100,000 in the common stock of 
corporation M. The dividends received from such investment are later 
applied by X in furtherance of its exempt purposes. Although there is a 
relationship between the return on the investment and the accomplishment 
of X’s exempt activities, there is no relationship between the investment per 
se and such accomplishment. Therefore, the investment cannot be considered 
as made primarily to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in 
170(c)(2)(B) and cannot qualify as program-related.
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Example 8: 
S, a private foundation, makes an investment in T, a business corporation, 
which qualifi es as a program-related investment under § 4944(c) at the time 
that it is made. All of T’s voting stock is owned by S. T experiences fi nancial 
and management problems which, in the judgment of the foundation, require 
changes in management, in fi nancial structure or in the form of the investment. 
The following three methods of resolving the problems appear feasible to 
S, but each of the three methods would result in reduction of the exempt 
purposes for which the program-related investment was initially made:
(a) Sale of stock or assets. The foundation sells its stock to an unrelated
 person. Payment is made in part at the time of sale; the balance is
 payable over an extended term of years with interest on the amount
 outstanding. The foundation receives a purchase-money mortgage.
(b) Lease. The corporation leases its assets for a term of years to an
 unrelated person, with an option in the lessee to buy the assets. 
 If the option is exercised, the terms of payment are to be similar 
 to those described in (a) of this example.
(c) Management contract. The corporation enters into a management
  contract that gives broad operating authority to one or more unrelated 
 persons for a term of years. The foundation and the unrelated persons 
 are obligated to contribute toward working capital requirements. 
 The unrelated persons will be compensated by a fi xed fee or a share 
 of profi ts, and they will receive an option to buy the stock held by S
 or the assets of the corporation. If the option is exercised, the terms 
 of payment are to be similar to those described in (a) of this example.
Each of the three methods involves a change in the form or terms of a 
program-related investment for the prudent protection of the foundation’s 
investment. Thus, under § 53.4944-3(a)(3)(i), none of the three transactions 
(nor any debt instruments or other obligations held by S as a result of 
engaging in one of these transactions) would cause the investment to cease 
to qualify as program-related.
Example 9: 
X is a socially and economically disadvantaged individual. Y, a private 
foundation, makes an interest-free loan to X for the primary purpose 
of enabling X to attend college. The loan has no signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. The 
loan signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of Y’s exempt activities 
and would not have been made but for such relationship between the 
loan and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, the loan is a program-related 
investment.
Example 10: 
Y, a private foundation, makes a high-risk investment in low-income 
housing, the indebtedness with respect to which is insured by the Federal 
Housing Administration. Y’s primary purpose in making the investment 
is to fi nance the purchase, rehabilitation, and construction of housing 
for low-income persons. The investment has no signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. 
The investment signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of Y’s exempt 
activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between 
the investment and Y’s exempt activities. Accordingly, the investment is 
program-related.
 
Under the standards of Reg. 53.4944–1(a)(2)(i), the investment of $10,000 
in the common stock of Y and the investment of $8,000 in the common 
stock of Z may be classifi ed as jeopardizing investments, while the 
investment of $5,000 in the common stock of X will not be so classifi ed. 
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Appendix D
Proposed Program-Related Investment Examples 
Submitted by the American Bar Association Section 
on Taxation
ABA SECTION ON TAXATION DRAFT EXAMPLES OF 
PROGRAM-RELATED INVESTMENTS (“PRIs”) (FOR ADDITION 
TO TREAS. REG. § 53.4944-3(b)) AND ANALYSIS OF EACH
Example 1:
Development of New Drug
C is a major, publicly traded pharmaceutical company with a substantial 
research and development budget. P is a private foundation whose exempt 
purposes include improving public health worldwide. P has consulted 
experts who have advised P that, with enough fi nancial support, a drug 
(D) might be developed within 10 years to effectively treat a debilitating 
disease affecting millions of people in poor third-world countries. C does 
not have a research program directed at developing drug D, and P has 
concluded that commercial drug companies like C are unlikely to devote 
the resources required because the potential market for drug D is not as 
certain or as immediately profi table as others C can pursue. If drug D can 
be successfully developed and marketed, it could substantially improve 
public health in the affected countries as well as producing a very large 
profi t for C. P has agreed to provide a loan to C at a below-market rate 
of interest, if C will devote the loan and a stated percentage of its own 
research and development funds to developing drug D over the next 10 
years, and agrees to either manufacture and market or license drug D if 
developed in that time. C would not be willing to engage in such research 
activities absent P’s loan. P’s primary purpose in making the loan is to 
increase the likelihood and speed of development and marketing of drug 
D, in order to improve public health. The loan has no signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. The 
loan signifi cantly furthers P’s exempt purpose and would not have been 
made but for the relationship between the loan and that exempt purpose. 
The loan is a program-related investment.
Analysis: The possibility that the pharmaceutical company (C) might 
make a profi t on the sale of the new drug (D) to be developed is 
secondary; this hasn’t been seen as a problem since Plumstead Theatre 
Society v. Comm’r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff’d, 675 F. 2d 244 (9th Cir. 
1982). But for P’s below-market-rate loan, C would not do the research 
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and development necessary to bring D to the market. P’s purpose in 
making the loan is to facilitate the development and marketing of D, 
which will likely substantially improve the health of millions of people in 
poor third-world countries. While it is clear that if an activity is charitable 
when conducted in the U.S., it is likewise charitable if conducted in a 
foreign country, none of the existing Examples make this point. 
Example 2:
Development of New Drug
Assume the facts as stated in Example 1, except that instead of a loan, C 
wants P to take an equity position in C in exchange for C’s commitment 
to work on drug D. C has not been able to secure any venture capitalist 
investors because of the high risk involved in developing a new drug. 
Although, if successful, P’s equity holding in C is likely to increase in value 
greatly, the investment has no signifi cant purpose involving the production 
of income or appreciation of property. The investment signifi cantly furthers 
P’s exempt purpose and would not have been made but for the relationship 
between the loan and that exempt purpose. P’s investment in shares of C is a 
program-related investment. 
Analysis: This proposed Example ties together an equity investment in a 
for-profi t company — which is already a permitted form of PRI, even though 
there is a possibility of a large return — with accomplishing a charitable 
purpose in a foreign country, which is also clearly permitted. None of the 
existing Examples in the Treasury Regulations contain both features. 
Example 3:
Development of New Drug
Assume the facts as stated in Example 1, except that drug D has already 
been developed and tested, and is now ready to bring to market. However, 
due to cash constraints, C is currently unwilling to incur the substantial 
expenditures required to market, manufacture, and distribute drug D and 
train health-care providers in its use unless P agrees to make the loan. The 
loan signifi cantly furthers P’s exempt purpose and would not have been 
made but for the relationship between the loan and that exempt purpose. 
The loan has no signifi cant purpose involving the production of income or 
appreciation of property. P’s loan is a program-related investment.
Analysis: The same as Example 1. C does not have the capital to bring the 
drug to market. P’s below-market-rate loan will provide funds necessary 
for P to manufacture, market, and distribute drug D, and train health-
care providers in its use, thereby benefi ting potentially millions of persons 
in poor third-world countries. The fact that C will make a profi t on 
the manufacture and sale of D is secondary to the accomplishment of a 
clear charitable purpose. Although this hasn’t been a problem since the 
Plumstead Theatre case, the point still should still be made clear. 
 
Example 4:
Development of New Organic-Farming Process
C is a start-up company that has been actively seeking venture capital 
fi nancing, so far unsuccessfully. C’s “product” is a new process that 
would greatly reduce the losses of certain crops to pests without the use 
of pesticides, thereby making organic farming of such crops cheaper, more 
profi table, and more widespread. P is a private foundation whose exempt 
purposes include fostering and promoting a cleaner environment. P has 
concluded that if C’s process is widely adopted, it will result in greater 
use of organic farming and a substantial reduction in the world’s total 
pesticide burden. C has approached P to invest in shares of C. As with 
all venture-capital investments, the risk of loss is extremely high, but, if 
successful, potential returns on investment are also extremely high. C has 
obtained commitments from several venture-capitalist investors, but not 
enough to move forward. C is offering shares to P on terms less favorable 
than those offered to the venture-capitalist investors. P’s purpose in 
investing in C is to allow C to successfully market its new process, causing 
it to be widely adopted, and thereby reducing pesticide use, resulting in 
a cleaner environment. The investment signifi cantly furthers P’s exempt 
purposes and would not have been made but for the relationship between 
the loan and that exempt purpose. The investment has no signifi cant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of 
property, although if C is successful, the value of P’s shares could increase 
signifi cantly. P’s equity investment in C is a program-related investment.
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Analysis: The possibility that the company (C), other investors, or P might 
make a substantial amount of money if the new “product” is successful is 
secondary; this has been clear since the Plumstead Theatre case. But for P’s 
investment the new “product” would not be developed and made available. 
C does not have the capital to bring the new “product” to market. P’s 
purpose in investing in C is to allow the development of an organic farming 
process whose use will result in signifi cant environmental benefi ts, not 
fi nancial returns. While there are Revenue Rulings, Private Letter Rulings, 
cases and federal legislation favoring efforts to preserve and protect the 
environment, none of the existing Examples in the Treasury Regulations 
address this important charitable endeavor. 
Note that P is putting in the last dollars, which were otherwise unavailable. 
Query whether or not it would be permissible in such a situation for P to 
invest on the same terms as the for-profi t investors? 
Example 5:
Loan with Equity Kicker
Assume the facts as stated in Example 4, except that P’s investment will take 
the form of a loan with a below-market interest rate, and C has also offered P 
pre-initial public offering shares in C as an inducement to make the loan. If C 
is unsuccessful, the shares will be worthless, but if successful, the value of the 
shares could increase enough so that P would receive an extremely high rate 
of return on its investment. C has made the same offer to a series of venture 
capitalist investors, but was unable to obtain fi nancing on these terms. P’s loan 
to C, and investment in shares of C, are both program-related investments.
Analysis: The addition of pre-IPO shares to P’s potential return should 
not have any effect on the loan and equity investment qualifying as a PRI. 
The existing Treasury Regulations provide generally that the fact that an 
investment produces signifi cant income or capital appreciation shall not, in 
the absence of other factors, be conclusive evidence of a signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or appreciation of property. This 
Example provides a look at some of the “other factors” to be considered. 
The existing Treasury Regulations further provide that it is relevant whether 
the hypothetical investor solely engaged in investment for profi t would be 
likely to make the investment on the same terms as the private foundation. 
In this Example, it was clear that venture capitalists would not make 
the same investment on the same terms. This is a second reason why the 
inclusion of an equity “kicker” should not prevent the investment from 
being a PRI.
Example 6:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-51-005 (Sept. 15, 1995), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-14-
063 (Jan. 10, 1990) (grant/loan) and Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162)
Loans to Media in Former Communist Block Countries
X is a newspaper, Y is a television station, and Z is a radio station, all 
located in former communist block countries. In those countries, there is 
no effective banking system and the rates of return demanded by non-
bank lenders are not fi nancially feasible for the borrowers. P is a private 
foundation whose exempt purposes include promoting the development 
of independent, non-governmental, non-partisan, tolerant, and non-
extremist media in countries that have historically been “closed” (or non-
democratic). P makes loans to X, Y, and Z, on terms more favorable than 
would be available (if at all) from local commercial lenders, to promote 
independent, fair, honest, and responsible media in those countries. The 
loans signifi cantly further the accomplishment of P’s exempt activities and 
would not have been made but for such relationship between the loans 
and P’s exempt activities. The loans have no signifi cant purpose involving 
the production of income or appreciation of property. Although X, Y, and 
Z are for-profi t businesses, they are merely the instruments by which P 
seeks to accomplish its exempt purposes. Accordingly, the investment is a 
program-related investment. 
Analysis: First, this Example addresses development of “free” news media 
in former communist block countries. This is a clear charitable purpose, 
and was the subject of a Private Letter Ruling. Second, the investment 
is being made outside of the U.S., which, as discussed above, should not 
change the analysis. Third, the loans are being made to for-profi t entities. 
The existing Treasury Regulations (Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i)) 
already provide that the “purposes described in 170(c)(2)(B)” shall be 
treated as including such purposes irrespective of whether or not they are 
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actually carried out by organizations described in 170(c). The “merely the 
instruments” language from Rev. Rul. 74-587 is clearer. Inclusion of that 
language in one or more new Examples would be helpful. Lastly, P is making 
the loans in countries where there is no effective banking system or where the 
rates of return demanded are not fi nancially feasible, and on more favorable 
terms than otherwise available, if at all. There is no profi t motive, only a 
charitable purpose being served. 
Example 7:
Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-10-066 (Dec. 15, 1998)
Investment in LLC
B and C are private foundations, located in D, an economically depressed city. 
The exempt purposes of B and C include alleviating poverty, providing relief 
to the poor and distressed, and combating community deterioration. Both B 
and C make signifi cant grants for economic development activity in D. B and C 
propose the formation of a Limited Liability Company (LLC X) with E, a for-
profi t entity well-experienced in technology transfer and business development. 
E will be the 51% owner and manager of LLC X. The purposes of LLC X will 
be to supplement and enhance technology transfer in D’s universities; assist 
in the creation of new technology businesses in D; help fi nance technology 
businesses that agree to locate their operations in economically depressed areas 
of D; and to encourage, support, and supplement the technology businesses 
by offering access to competent business advice and services. In addition, each 
of the technology businesses agrees to repay the investment in the event they 
leave D. If LLC X is unsuccessful, the investments by B and C will be worthless. 
The investments by B and C signifi cantly further the accomplishment of their 
exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the investments and the exempt activities of B and C, respectively. 
No signifi cant purpose of the investments is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property. Accordingly, the investments by B and C in LLC 
X are program-related investments even though B and C may both realize a 
substantial profi t if LLC X is successful. 
Analysis: None of the present Examples in the Treasury Regulations 
contemplate investments in LLCs. Although that form of business 
organization did not exist when the Regulations on PRIs were being 
written, it has become a commonly used investment vehicle and should 
be so recognized, and take its place along with corporations and limited 
partnerships. The I.R.S. issued a Private Letter Ruling on facts similar to 
these. There is the possibility that foundations B and C may both realize 
a substantial profi t on their interests in LLC X if it is successful; but that 
is not the reason they made their investments. This Example illustrates 
that investments in 21st Century high technology are within the scope of 
170(c)(2)(B), notwithstanding the antiquity of that , and may be made in 
the form of a PRI in appropriate circumstances. 
Example 8:
Terrorist Attack
X, Y, and Z are small- to mid-sized for-profi t business enterprises located in 
N, an urban area. On date S, a terrorist attack occurs in N, and results in 
signifi cant damage to the business district of N where the offi ces of X, Y, and 
Z are located. The business operations of X, Y, and Z are affected because 
much of the infrastructure and many of the buildings in the business district 
have been damaged, and customers do not have easy access to the business 
district as a result of the attack. X, Y, and Z are having diffi culty meeting 
the fi nancial needs of their respective businesses. Conventional sources of 
funds are unwilling or unable to provide funds to X, Y, or Z on terms those 
businesses consider economically feasible. P is a private foundation whose 
exempt purposes include alleviating poverty, providing relief to the poor and 
distressed, and combating community deterioration. P makes loans to X, 
Y, and Z bearing rates of interest somewhat refl ecting the credit risk of the 
businesses and circumstances, but fi nancially acceptable to X, Y, and Z. P’s 
primary purpose for making such loans is to assist those businesses located 
in the business district of N affected by the terrorist attack. The loans 
signifi cantly further the accomplishment of P’s exempt activities and would 
not have been made but for such relationship between the loan and P’s 
exempt activities. The loans made by P have no signifi cant purpose involving 
the production of income or the appreciation of property. Accordingly, the 
loans to X, Y, and Z are all program-related investments.
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Analysis: This Example addresses a traditional charitable purpose, namely, 
economic redevelopment of a physically “blighted” area, in starkly 
modern 21st Century clothes. The fact that the blight and accompanying 
economic distress were caused by the acts of terrorists, rather than 
urban decay, does not change the fact that their elimination serves a very 
traditional charitable purpose. While urban redevelopment is refl ected 
in several Examples in the existing Treasury Regulations, it would be 
helpful to have a new Example should the need ever again arise and the 
private foundation community wanted to act quickly, without having to 
seek rulings. No further discussion is necessary with respect to either (a) 
no signifi cant purpose of a below-market rate loan is the production of 
income or (b) the “instruments” through which the foundation seeks to 
accomplish its charitable purposes are not themselves tax-exempt entities. 
Example 9:
National Disaster
Assume the same facts as stated in Example 8, but, instead of a terrorist 
attack, the damage to the business district in N was caused by a natural 
disaster (such as a hurricane, fl ood, earthquake or wildfi re). P, a private 
foundation, makes loans to X, Y, and Z bearing rates of interest somewhat 
refl ecting the credit risk of the business circumstances, but fi nancially 
acceptable to X, Y, and Z. P’s primary purpose for making such loans is to 
assist those businesses located in the business district of N affected by the 
disaster. The loans signifi cantly further the accomplishment of P’s exempt 
activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between 
the loan and P’s exempt activities. The loans made by P have no signifi cant 
purpose involving the production of income or the appreciation of property. 
Accordingly, the loans to X, Y, and Z are all program-related investments. 
Analysis: The same as Example 8, except that natural disasters are not new. 
Nonetheless, it would be helpful to have an Example covering a disaster. 
Perhaps it should address extensive damage to the business community 
caused by either a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. 
Example 10:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-36-026 (June 11, 2001) and Rev. Rul. 74-
587, 1974-2 C.B. 162)
Environmental Investments in Third-World Countries
F is a foreign, for-profi t fi nancial intermediary formed for the purpose 
of fi nancing and promoting the expansion of environmentally oriented 
businesses that will contribute to conservation and economic development 
in areas of third-world countries that are economically or environmentally 
sensitive. F will make direct investments in businesses in third-world 
countries that involve the sustainable use of natural resources, foster the 
preservation of biological diversity, or engage in organic agriculture with 
biodiversity linkages. P, a private foundation which is a strong supporter 
of biodiversity and environmental sustainability, as well as development 
in economically undeveloped or underdeveloped countries or regions, 
makes a capital investment in F. The investment signifi cantly furthers the 
accomplishment of P’s exempt activities and would not have been made 
but for such relationship between the investment and P’s exempt activities. 
The investment by P has no signifi cant purpose involving the production of 
income or the appreciation of property. Although F is a for-profi t business, 
it is merely the instrument by which P seeks to accomplish its exempt 
purposes. Accordingly, P’s investment is a program-related investment. 
Analysis: Proposed Examples 10 and 11, based on a recent Private Letter 
Ruling, deal with environmental purposes and economic development in 
poor third-world countries, plus several important but heretofore ignored 
issues. In our world economy, it is important to be able to use foreign, for-
profi t fi nancial intermediaries to accomplish 21st Century philanthropic 
goals. This is not much of a “stretch” from the non-tax-exempt entities, 
described in Rev. Rul. 74-587 which were “merely the instruments” by 
which the intended charitable purposes were accomplished. 
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Example 11:
Projected Rate of Return on Investment in 
Third-World Countries
Assume the facts as stated in Example 10 and that F has a goal of an 18% 
to 22% rate of return for its investors. Although seemingly high on its face 
for domestic investments, the projected rate of return is signifi cantly less 
than the acceptable rate of return on international venture capital fund 
investments of comparable risk in third-world countries. The targeted rate 
of return, taken as a factor by itself by P, in a normal investment strategy 
(and not in conjunction with a program-related investment), would not 
compensate P for the speculative nature of the investment and overall risk 
associated with F’s unique investment characteristics. The investment has 
no signifi cant purpose involving the production of income or appreciation 
of property. Although F is a for-profi t business, it is merely the instrument 
by which P seeks to accomplish its exempt purposes. Accordingly, the 
investment is a program-related investment even though P may earn 
income from the investment in an amount comparable to or higher than 
earnings from conventional domestic portfolio investments. 
Analysis: Initially, the same as Example 10. In addition, this Example 
makes it clear that although the projected rate of return appears high on 
its face, it is, in fact, signifi cantly less than an acceptable rate of return on 
international venture capital fund investments of comparable risk in third-
world countries. This Example gives clear meaning to the provision in the 
existing Treasury Regulations that one has to look beyond the mere fact 
that the investment “produces signifi cant income or capital appreciation” 
to the “presence or absence of other factors” to determine whether or 
not a signifi cant purpose of the investment is the production of income or 
appreciation of property. Even with a projected return of 18% to 22%, 
the hypothetical investor solely engaged in investment for profi t would not 
make this investment in a third-world fi nancial intermediary. The rate was 
high, but not high enough. Therefore, P can make the investment as a PRI. 
Example 12:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-26-048 (Mar. 31, 1998) and Rev. Rul. 74-587, 
1974-2 C.B. 162)
Economic Development in Depressed Countries
W and X are commercial banks, Y is a small agricultural business, and 
Z is a small manufacturing business, all located in countries that are 
economically depressed, largely because most commercial enterprises 
in those countries had in the past been controlled by the government. 
Businesses in those countries are either unable to obtain fi nancing from 
local commercial sources or are unable to obtain such fi nancing on 
economically feasible terms. P is a private foundation whose exempt 
purposes include alleviating poverty, providing relief to the poor and 
distressed, and combating community deterioration. P did the following 
(collectively, the “Foreign Investments”): 
(a) provided fi nancial assistance to W, in the form of deposit insurance
 (to encourage deposits), and required W to make loans to local small
 businesses at below market interest rates and following standardized 
 lending practices developed by P; 
(b) guaranteed a loan by X to Y; and 
(c) made an unsecured, below-market-rate loan to Z (or otherwise on
 less favorable terms than customarily required by commercial lenders
 or investors for profi t).
The Foreign Investments all signifi cantly further the accomplishment of P’s 
exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the Foreign Investments and P’s exempt activities. The Foreign 
Investments have no signifi cant purpose involving the production of 
income or appreciation of property. Although W, X, Y, and Z are for-profi t 
businesses, they are merely the instruments by which P seeks to accomplish 
its exempt purposes. Accordingly, all of the Foreign Investments constitute 
program-related investments. 
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Analysis: There is no question but that that if an activity is charitable when 
conducted in the United States, it is likewise charitable if conducted in a 
foreign country; that is not the main point to be made by this Example. 
Nor that loans to for-profi t entities may be PRIs. One of the two signifi cant 
features of this Example, which is based on a Private Letter Ruling, is that 
P is providing credit enhancement, not money, in two of the three Foreign 
Investments. The effect is the same, however; W is able to attract deposits 
from its customers, and Y is able to obtain a loan from X. Of no less 
importance, if P is ever called upon to make good on its deposit insurance 
or loan guaranty, those payments will constitute PRIs and, as such, will be 
considered “qualifying distributions.” The second signifi cant feature of this 
Example is that the loan from P to company Z may not necessarily be at an 
interest rate which is “below market.” The interest rate may be at “market,” 
but some other term or terms of the loan will be below or not as attractive as 
those in loans made by commercial lenders or investors for profi t under like 
circumstances.
Example 13:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-43-058 (Aug. 6, 1999), Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2000-36-050 (June 13, 2000, and Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162)
Foreign Economic Development 
M is a poor country with a shortage of energy, natural resources, food and 
housing, and where local bank loans to businesses, if available, are at rates 
which are not economically feasible. W and X are commercial banks, and Y is 
a struggling small business, all located in M. Z is a fi nancially secure business 
located elsewhere and unwilling to locate any operations in M without some 
fi nancial inducements. P is a private foundation whose exempt purposes 
include alleviating poverty, providing relief to the poor and distressed, and 
combating community deterioration. P did the following (collectively, the 
“Foreign Investments”): 
(a) made a loan to the government of M at a below market rate, the   
 terms of which required the money to be reloaned to W and X (
 who both joined in the loan agreement) at a below market rate, and 
 that W and X reloan those proceeds to local small businesses at below
 market rates following standardized lending practices developed by P; 
(b) made a below-market-rate loan to Y (or otherwise on less-favorable  
 terms than customarily required by commercial lenders or investors  
 for profi t); and 
(c) made a below-market-rate loan to Z (or otherwise on less-favorable
 terms than customarily required by commercial lenders or investors
 for profi t) on the condition that Z locate operations in M. 
The Foreign Investments all signifi cantly further the accomplishment of P’s 
exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the Foreign Investments and P’s exempt activities. The Foreign 
Investments have no signifi cant purpose involving the production of 
income or appreciation of property. Although W, X, Y, and Z are for-profi t 
businesses, they are merely the instruments by which P seeks to accomplish 
its exempt purposes. Accordingly, all of the Foreign Investments constitute 
program-related investments. 
Analysis: The below-market-rate loan to Y shows how an investment in 
a foreign for-profi t business can accomplish a charitable purpose. The 
below-market-rate loan to the government of M, the proceeds of which 
must be reloaned to commercial banks in M, who must then reloan those 
proceeds at below-market rates following standardized lending practices 
developed by P, shows that there can be some considerable distance 
between the private foundation and the organization (the “instrument”) 
actually accomplishing the charitable purpose, while still qualifying as 
a PRI. The point of the below-market-rate loan to induce Z to locate 
operations in M is that a foundation is no longer limited to inducing 
companies to locate (and thereby provide jobs) in blighted inner-city 
neighborhoods in the United States, as envisioned by the Examples in the 
existing Treasury Regulations. Another signifi cant feature of this Example 
is that the loans by P to companies Y and Z may not necessarily be at 
an interest rate which is “below market.” The interest rates may be at 
“market,” but some other term or terms of the loans will be below or not 
as attractive as those in loans made by commercial lenders or investors for 
profi t under like circumstances.
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Example 14:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-011-10 (Oct. 8, 1982))
Rate of Return on Investment in Deteriorated Downtown 
X is a limited partnership which will construct and own a large hotel in the 
presently blighted and deteriorated downtown area of Y. The land on which 
the hotel will be constructed is owned by the City of Y, which acquired it by 
eminent domain as part of a downtown redevelopment plan. Y will lease the 
land to X for 99 years. Long-term fi nancing for the new hotel is being provided 
by a group of local banks, corporations and foundations. The foundations will 
receive interest on their loans at a rate considerably over the current “prime” 
rate and normal return on their portfolio investments, and the other lenders 
will receive the same rate plus a percentage of total room rentals over a set 
amount. P is a private foundation whose exempt purposes include alleviating 
poverty, providing relief to the poor and distressed, and combating community 
deterioration. P makes an investment in the form of a loan to X to help fi nance 
the new hotel, whose fi nancial success is far from certain. The investment 
signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of P’s exempt activities and would 
not have been made but for such relationship between the investment and P’s 
exempt activities. The fact that P will receive a return on its investment which 
is considerably over the then-current “prime” rate and normal return on 
portfolio investments does not, by itself, necessarily indicate a profi t motive; 
all factors must be considered. The investment has no signifi cant purpose 
involving the production of income or appreciation of property. Accordingly, 
the investment is a program-related investment even though P may earn 
income from the investment at a rate considerably above that available from 
conventional portfolio investments by foundations. 
Analysis: This Example, which is based on a Private Letter Ruling, 
illustrates a very traditional charitable endeavor, namely, revitalizing a 
deteriorated downtown area in a U.S. city. What is of particular interest 
is that the interest rate (15.0% in the actual Private Letter Ruling) was 
considerably over the then-current “prime” rate and normal return on 
foundations’ portfolio investments. This helps to show that even though 
the rate of return for a domestic investment may appear high on its face, 
“other factors” are relevant in determining whether a signifi cant purpose 
of the investment is the production of income or appreciation of property. 
Example 15:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-33-063 (May 24, 1990) and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
2000-43-050 (July 25, 2000))
Credit Enhancement & Fees
X, a tax-exempt science museum, owns land on which it wants to construct 
a larger, more modern museum building, but does not have a suffi cient 
credit rating to obtain long-term fi nancing at an affordable rate. The 
specifi c use for which the new museum will be constructed reduces its value 
as collateral. P is a private foundation whose purposes include charitable, 
scientifi c and educational purposes. P makes the following investments:
(a) P issues a letter of credit in favor of the bond trustee to guaranty
 payment of the fi rst 20% of the principal amount of 20-year museum 
 construction bonds to be issued by X and sold to investors, which 
 bonds will be secured by the land and new museum building and bear
  a market interest rate; or 
(b) Instead of issuing a letter of credit, P purchases from its bank 
 (and guarantees to the bank) a letter of credit in favor of an insurance 
 company to guaranty payment of the fi rst 20% of the principal 
 amount of a 20-year mortgage loan to be made to the museum by 
 the insurance company, which loan will be secured by the land and 
 new museum building and bear a market interest rate; or 
(c) Instead of issuing or purchasing a letter of credit, P signs a guaranty 
 of payment of the fi rst 20% of the principal amount of a 20-year 
 mortgage loan to be made to the museum by a commercial bank, 
 which loan will be secured by the land and new museum building 
 and bear a market interest rate.
In each instance, P receives from X an initial fee in the amount of 1.0% of 
the amount of the total borrowing, plus an additional annual fee of 1.0% 
of the loan amount outstanding from time to time. 
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In all three instances, the investments signifi cantly further the accomplishment 
of P’s exempt activities and would not have been made but for such 
relationship between the investments and P’s exempt activities. The investments 
have no signifi cant purpose involving the production of income or appreciation 
of property. Accordingly, the investments are all program-related investments. 
Analysis: In the three scenarios in this Example (which combines two 
Private Letter Rulings) a foundation provides three different forms of credit 
enhancement to allow a science museum with a sagging credit rating to 
construct a larger, more modern building. In connection with the issuance 
of P’s own L/C, P’s purchase of an L/C from a local bank, and P’s directly 
guarantying the museum’s borrowing, P charged both initial and annual fees. 
Such fees, which are common in commercial lending and credit transactions, 
were approved in the two Private Letter Rulings cited. No signifi cant purpose 
of any of the three forms of credit enhancement furnished by P involves the 
production of income or appreciation of property, and all three transactions 
constitute PRIs. Further, if P is ever called upon to fund its L/C or guaranty, 
or repay the bank if the bank’s L/C is drawn upon, such payments by P will 
constitute qualifying distributions. 
Example 16:
Equity Investment with Equity Kicker
X is a small business enterprise located in Z, a country that is 
economically depressed. Because X has generated little or no net income 
since its inception, conventional lenders are unwilling to provide funds to 
X at reasonable interest rates unless it increases the amount of its equity 
capital. Consequently, P, a private foundation, as well as two for-profi t 
investors purchase shares of two new classes of X’s common stock. P’s 
exempt purposes include alleviating poverty, providing relief to the poor 
and distressed, and combating community deterioration. The two for-
profi t investors will be entitled to an annual dividend equal to 5% of 
X’s net income, while P will be entitled to no such preferential annual 
dividend. However, to compensate P for the increased risk of holding an 
equity investment in X, P will be entitled to receive an “equity kicker” in 
the form of a special dividend (to be paid annually) in any year in which 
X’s net income is in excess of a stated dollar amount. The dividend will 
be 10% of that amount. P’s primary purpose in purchasing the stock is 
to encourage economic development in Z, and no signifi cant purpose 
involves the production of income or the appreciation of property. The 
investment signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of P’s exempt 
activities and would not have been made but for such relationship between 
the investment and P’s exempt activities. Accordingly, the purchase of 
X’s common stock by P is a program-related investment, even though P 
may realize a sizeable profi t if X is successful and (i) the common stock 
appreciates in value and (ii) P is entitled to a special dividend in any year. 
Analysis: While this Example validates a foundation’s investment in a 
foreign country to accomplish some traditional charitable purposes, such 
as economic development and providing new jobs, the main feature is 
the form of that investment. It is important to note that although P may 
receive something more than an ordinary investor would in an ordinary 
investment situation, namely, the “equity kicker,” what P will receive is 
not the same as what the investors for profi t are receiving. Presumably, 
those investors would not make their investment in X on the same terms 
as offered to P; they are getting the fi rst 5.0% of X’s annual profi ts, 
starting with the fi rst dollar, as opposed to 10% over a stated level. This 
Example, too, shows that although P’s investment may produce signifi cant 
income or capital appreciation, that fact, in the absence of other factors, is 
not conclusive evidence of a signifi cant profi t motive. 
Example 17:
Loan with Equity Kicker
The facts are the same as in Example 16, except that P makes a loan to X 
bearing interest below the market rate for commercial loans of comparable 
risk (or otherwise on less favorable terms than customarily required by 
commercial lenders or investors for profi t). To induce P to make the loan 
to X, P will be entitled to receive an “equity kicker” in the form of the 
opportunity to purchase up to 100,000 shares of the common stock of 
X for $.01 per share in the event that the stock of X is sold in an initial 
public offering. The loan signifi cantly furthers the accomplishment of P’s 
exempt activities and would not have been made but for such relationship 
between the investment and P’s exempt activities. P’s primary purpose 
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in making the loan is to encourage economic development in Z, and no 
signifi cant purpose involves the production of income or the appreciation 
of property. Accordingly, the loan by P to X is a program-related 
investment, even though P may realize income from this investment in an 
amount higher than earnings from conventional portfolio investments due 
to the “equity kicker” feature of this investment. 
Analysis: The same as in Example 16, except this one involves a loan 
(rather than a stock purchase) with an “equity kicker.” In both instances, 
P is getting something different (and less valuable) than what the company 
must offer to attract investors for profi t. Even though the possibility exists 
for P to realize a sizeable return on its investment, P’s primary purpose in 
making the investment is to encourage economic development in Z and 
no “signifi cant purpose” of the investment in either Example involves 
the production of income or appreciation of property. Another important 
feature of this Example is that the loan by P to X may not necessarily be 
at an interest rate which is “below market.” The interest rate may be at 
“market,” but some other term or terms of the loan will be below or not 
as attractive as those in loans made by commercial lenders or investors for 
profi t under like circumstances. 
Example 18:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-24-022 (Mar. 13, 2001)/public charity)
Lessening the Burdens of Government
The downtown area of the City of M is old and deteriorated; further, it 
is located next to the area’s most distressed low-income community. The 
City, together with its local community, civic and business leaders, wants 
to regenerate the downtown area into a center of commerce, housing, 
transportation, governmental services, cultural activities, and higher 
educational opportunities. The redevelopment will also result in the 
creation of many new jobs. As a result of existing renewal projects, there 
is a signifi cant shortage of parking in the downtown area. The existing 
developments have both eliminated prior open-air parking lots and created 
an ever-increasing demand for parking. A study commissioned by the 
City of M determined that there is a desperate need for substantially more 
parking in the downtown area, which will get worse as redevelopment 
continues and more employees, persons using municipal services and the 
courthouse, shoppers, diners, and visitors come to the downtown area. 
Through its powers of eminent domain, the City of M acquired a large 
tract of land in the downtown area which is ideally suited for a parking 
garage. The City has agreed to lease the land to LLC X for development 
as a parking garage. LLC X is majority-owned and controlled by D, a 
for-profi t real estate developer, who will operate and manage the new 
parking garage and receive a management fee. The other members of LLC 
X will include local businesses, community organizations and civic-minded 
investors. LLC X will borrow some of the necessary construction funds 
from a group of local banks, at market interest rates, and mortgage the 
improvements as security for the loan.
P is a private foundation whose exempt purposes include alleviating 
poverty, providing relief to the poor and distressed, combating community 
deterioration and lessening the burdens of government. P has agreed to 
loan the remainder of the necessary funds to the LLC at a below-market 
interest rate, without collateral (or otherwise on less favorable terms than 
customarily required by commercial lenders or investors for profi t). 
The provision of additional parking is essential to serve the needs of 
the stores, restaurants, municipal buildings, courthouse, and cultural 
and educational facilities being developed, as well as job creation, and, 
therefore, will “lessen the burdens of government” within the meaning of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(d)(2). P’s loan to LLC X has no signifi cant 
purpose involving the production of income or appreciation of property. 
The loan signifi cantly furthers P’s exempt purposes and would not have 
been made but for the relationship between the loan and those exempt 
purposes. P’s loan is a program-related investment. 
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Analysis: Urban renewal and economic redevelopment of physically 
blighted and economically depressed neighborhoods are very traditional 
charitable purposes and are already captured in the Examples contained in 
the existing Treasury Regulations. However, none of those Examples deal 
with such activities in terms of “lessening the burdens of government,” as 
did the Private Letter Ruling on which this situation is based. It would be 
helpful to have a new Example of a PRI made for that explicit purpose. 
Here, too, P’s loan to LLC X may not necessarily be at an interest rate 
which is “below market.” The interest rate may be at “market,” but some 
other term or terms of the loan will be below or not as attractive as those 
in loans made by commercial lenders or investors for profi t under like 
circumstances. 
Example 19:
(Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-24-022 (Mar. 13, 2001)/public charity)
Single-Member LLC Owned by Foundation
The facts are the same as in Example 18, except that (a) foundation P 
is the sole owner and single member of LLC X, (b) the City of M sells 
the land for the parking garage to LLC X, (c) LLC X borrows 80% of 
the necessary construction funds from local banks at a market interest 
rate, with full recourse and secured by a mortgage on the land and new 
improvements, and (d) P invests an amount equal to the remaining 20% of 
the necessary construction funds in LLC X, from its own assets. Using LLC 
X to own and operate the parking garage insulates P’s charitable assets 
from potential judgments in favor of lenders, owners of damaged or stolen 
vehicles, or persons who might suffer injuries while on the garage premises. 
The separate existence of single-member LLC X, which is wholly-owned 
and managed by P, will be disregarded for tax purposes. Even though 
funds for construction of the parking garage will be borrowed from local 
banks, this will not result in P having any “debt-fi nanced income.” Further, 
neither P’s ownership and management of LLC X nor LLC X’s ownership 
and management of the parking garage will result in P having any “excess 
business holdings.” 
The provision of additional parking is essential to serve the needs of the 
stores, restaurants, municipal buildings, courthouse, and cultural and 
educational facilities being developed, as well as for job creation, and, 
therefore, will “lessen the burdens of government” within the meaning 
of 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(d)(2) of the Income Tax Regulations. P’s investment in 
LLC X has no signifi cant purpose involving the production of income or 
appreciation of property. The investment signifi cantly furthers P’s exempt 
purposes and would not have been made but for the relationship between 
the loan and those exempt purposes. P’s investment in LLC X is a program-
related investment. 
Analysis: In Example 19, the “burdens of government” are lessened 
through construction of a new parking garage in the city’s blighted 
downtown district by an LLC that is wholly owned by a private 
foundation. This raises many interesting and important 21st century 
issues, including disregarding the single-member LLC for tax purposes 
(and instead looking solely at P); the wholly owned LLC’s borrowing of 
funds to construct the parking garage not generating any “debt-fi nanced 
income” for P; and the LLC’s 100% ownership of the parking garage not 
constituting an “excess business holding” by P. As private foundations 
move forward with more contemporary forms of grantmaking, and 
encounter more contemporary forms of doing business, these will be 
important considerations.
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Appendix E
Case Study: California
I. Introduction
 
Private foundations in California are established either as nonprofi t 
public benefi t corporations under the California Corporation Code, or as 
charitable trusts under the California Probate Code. 
Most California foundations are organized as nonprofi t public benefi t 
corporations, and as such are subject to the California Corporations 
Code,135 and UMIFA, which is anticipated to be superseded by the 
enactment of UPMIFA in 2008. California foundations organized as 
nonprofi t public benefi t corporations must register and report to the 
Attorney General’s Registry of Charitable Trusts. California law provides 
that donor intent will override the Corporations Code provisions 
governing the investment of charitable funds.136 
Foundations organized as charitable trusts must comply with the relevant 
sections of the California Probate Code,137 and with UPIA.138 The law 
requires a trustee to administer the trust in strict compliance with the 
trust instrument,139 and UPIA specifi cally allows a settlor of a trust to set 
out terms of the trust that will expand on or restrict the prudent investor 
standard in the statute.140 Trusts are required to be registered and reported 
upon to the Attorney General’s Registry of Charitable Trusts as well.
The Attorney General’s Charitable Trust Division has enforcement power 
to address a breach of trust, asset diversion, mismanagement of charitable 
assets, and fraud.141 
135 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5230-39 (governing the standard of  conduct owed by directors to the
 corporation) and §§ 5240-41 (governing investment standards) are relevant to this discussion.
136 CAL. CORP. CODE § 5240(c).
137 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002 (Trustee’s Duties in General – Duty of  Loyalty); § 16440 (Duty of
  Good Faith); & §§ 16100-16105 (Duties of  Trustees of  Private Foundations, Charitable Trusts) 
 are most relevant.
138 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 16045-16054 and §§ 16002-16003.
139 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16000.
140 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16046(b).
141 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5250, 5223; GOV’T CODE §§ 12588, 12598. See also EDMUND G. BROWN,
  JR., AG, STATE OF CA., CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES (2005), 
 available at http://ag.ca.gov/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf. 
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II.  Uniform Prudent Management of    
 Institutional Funds Act 
The California legislature has recently adopted UPMIFA, and the bill will 
enter into law on January 1, 2009.142 The legislature adopted UPMIFA in 
its entirety, including the optional presumption of imprudence should annual 
spending exceed seven percent.  
Given the status of the proposed legislation, no case law has yet been 
generated. 
III.  Uniform Management of Institutional 
 Funds Act 
UMIFA was enacted into law in California effective July 1, 1991, as part 
of the California Probate Code.143 The uniform act was adopted in its 
entirety, without changes.144 Prior to its adoption as part of the probate 
code, UMIFA applied only to educational institutions as part of the 
California Education Code.145
142 S.B. 1329. To check the status of  the bill, see http://www.leginfo.ca.gov (follow “Bill Information”  
 hyperlink) (last visited October 3, 2008). 
143 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 18500-18509.
144 S.B. 2649, 2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2008).
145 CA S. B. 2649 extended its application to all religious and charitable organizations with 
 endowment funds.
The legislative history of UMIFA’s introduction and enactment in 
California does not shed light on specifi c views held by California 
legislators of fi duciary responsibility, beyond the strictures set out by 
the uniform act itself.146 
No California cases directly cite to either the relevant sections of the 
California Probate Code147 or to UMIFA.148 
   
IV. Uniform Prudent Investors Act
The California legislature enacted UPIA into law effective January 1, 
1996, as part of the California Probate Code.149 The California version 
of UPIA is the same in substance as the uniform version of the act.150 
The most signifi cant provisions of the bill and a brief commentary 
addressing the new features that UPIA adds to trust law are set out in 
the legislative history to the California version of the uniform act.151 
This commentary is consistent with the uniform act. 
146 See California Legislature, 2 Senate Final History 1121, 1727 (1989-1990 Regular Session),available 
 at http://192.234.213.35/clerkarchive (click on “Histories/Indexes, then click on“1989”). 
147 CAL. PROB. CODE § 18500.
148 The one case that references UMIFA is In re Matter of  the Estate of  Collins 72 Cal. App. 3d
 663, 669-72 (1977). This case was decided well before California adopted UMIFA, but references
 the Uniform Management of  Institutional Funds Act, Civ. Code §§ 2290.1-2290.12, as support
  for the proposition that “the trustee is under a duty to the benefi ciary to distribute the risk of  loss
 by reasonable diversifi cation of  investments, unless under the circumstances it is not prudent
  to do so.” The case held that defendant trustees failed to follow the prudent investor standard with
  respect to administration of  testamentary trust where they invested two-thirds of  trust principal in a
  single investment, which was real property secured only by a second deed of  trust, and failed toZ
  make adequate investigation of  either borrowers or collateral.
149  CAL. PROB. CODE § 16045. 
150 The California legislation does depart from UPIA with respect to the reliance standard: California
 law adopts a “good faith” reliance standard under which a trustee shall not be held liable to a
  benefi ciary for the trustee’s good faith reliance on the express provisions of  the trust instrument.  
 CAL. PROB. CODE § 16046. By contrast, UPIA espouses a “reasonable” reliance standard.
151 S.B. 222 Senate Floor Bill Analysis describes the most signifi cant provisions of  the bill and provides
  brief  commentary addressing the new features that UPIA adds to trust law at the time. See S.B. 222
  B. An. (May 16, 1995), available at 
 http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/sen/sb_0201-0250/sb_222_cfa_950516_152342_sen_fl oor.html. 
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With regard to risk and investment decisions, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee Bill Analysis notes, “Rather than avoiding risk categorically, 
the UPIA encourages balancing of risk and return at levels appropriate 
to the purposes of the trust.”152 This language may be interpreted to 
permit consideration for the charitable purpose of a charitable trust, and 
accordingly, an investment that advances that purpose may be permissible 
even if it delivered below-market returns – of course, subject as always 
to the overall portfolio strategy. As discussed above at I.B.4, UPIA lists 
appropriate circumstances to consider in investing and managing a trust’s 
assets. The purposes of the trust, as well as “an asset’s special relationship 
and special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the 
benefi ciaries” may weigh in an investment decision alongside expected returns. 
The cases litigated under California Probate Code §16045 (UPIA) provide no 
specifi c guidance concerning mission investing by charitable trusts.153 Case law 
under the statutorily mandated duty of loyalty is similarly silent on whether 
it is permissible for a charitable trust to consider the impact on mission of a 
foundation’s investments.154 
152 Id.
153 The only case citing to CAL. PROB. CODE § 16045 that concerns the duty of  care alleges the
  failure of  a corporate trustee to oversee fi duciary accounts adequately. Investment decisions
  were not made for the accounts on an individualized basis, and excessive expenses were incurred. 
 Ultimately, however, the case turned on an issue of  hierarchy of  federal over state laws, and held
 that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of  1998 preempts the state-law class claims. 
 Thus, the judge dismissed all class claims, including the complaint under CAL. PROB. CODE §
 16045. Kutten v. Bank of  America, slip op. 2007 WL 2485001 (E.D.Mo. Aug 29, 2007). 
154 The reported cases under CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002 interpret aspects of  the law other than
 investing per se, and most relate to personal, not charitable, trusts. See, e.g., People v. Larkin, 
 413 F. Supp. 978 (Cal. 1976) (a trustee who used trust assets as collateral to secure a loan for the 
 trustee’s own for-profi t company breached his fi duciary duty under CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002; 
 it was of  no consequence that the purported motive for obtaining the loan was the generation 
 of  profi ts that would be rechanneled into the trust); Lynch v. Spilman 67 Cal. 2d 251 (1967) 
 (defi ning the nature of  a charitable trust as “[a charitable corporation] organized for the purpose,
 among other things, of  promoting the welfare of  mankind at large, or of  a community, or of  some  
 class forming a part of  it indefi nite as to numbers and individuals”); Allen v. Meyers, 5 Cal. 2d 311
 (Cal. 1936) (in dealing with the benefi ciaries the trustee must show the utmost good faith; when the
 trustee sought to have the children of  his deceased wife release him from their claims to real
 property, it was his duty to inform them of  the money left by their mother on deposit in the bank,
 and the nature, character, and value any other property left by her as well as that deeded to him 
 for their benefi t). 
155 CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23709(a).
156 “A private foundation shall not be exempt from taxation under § 23701(d) unless its governing  
 instrument includes provisions the effects of  which are … (B) To prohibit the foundation from
 engaging in any act of  self-dealing (as defi ned in § 4941 of  the I.R.C.), from retaining any excess
 business holdings (as defi ned in § 4943 of  the I.R.C.), from making any investments in such manner
 as to subject the foundation to tax under § 4944 of  the I.R.C.” (emphasis added). CAL. REV. & TAX.
 CODE § 23708(e).
157 For legal opinions of  the California Attorney General, see http://ag.ca.gov/opinions/. Among those
 decisions reported concerning charitable organizations, none related to charitable trust or nonprofi t
 investments. See Op. Ca. Att’y Gen. 04-502 (Mar. 28, 2005) (a city council member who serves of
 the board of  a nonprofi t trust may participate in a city council decision to lease a parcel of  land to
  a business owner from whom the city council member solicited money on behalf  of  the nonprofi t); 
 Op. Ca. Att’y Gen. 96-301 (Feb. 7, 1997) (a member of  a board of  retirement established under 
 the County Employees Retirement Law of  1937 may be removed from offi ce for the willful breach
 of  fi duciary duty or other malfeasance); Op. Ca. Att’y Gen. 95-807 (June 19, 1996) (concluding that
 “the treasurer of  a general law county may grant to a contract investment manager, who is 
 not a deputy of  the treasurer, discretionary authority to invest funds on deposit with the treasurer, 
 provided that the treasurer exercises prudence in the selection of  the manager and imposes 
 suitable safeguards to prevent abuse in the exercise of  discretion by the manager. The treasurer 
 would remain responsible for any investment decisions made by the manager”); Op. Ca. Att’y Gen.
 95-105 (1995) (a public cemetery can use income from its endowment care fund to maintain roads 
 located within the cemetery’s boundaries).
V.  Integration of California and 
 Federal Tax Laws
California tax law is consistent with the federal tax law applicable to 
private foundations. Any changes to the private foundation rules of the 
I.R.C. would be incorporated into California law automatically. 
The California Revenue and Taxation Code adopts the I.R.C.’s defi nition 
of “private foundation.”155 California has not adopted its own provisions 
prohibiting jeopardizing investments or providing a program-related 
investment exception; rather, it has incorporated I.R.C. § 4944 by 
reference.156 Any clarifi cations of this section by the I.R.S. would be 
incorporated into the California tax code as well. 
VI.  Practice Notes
No opinions published by the Attorney General address the prudence of 
investments made by public benefi t corporations or trusts.167 The lack 
of issued opinions and other guidance from the Attorney General’s offi ce 
with respect to investments by charitable organizations indicates that 
investment decisions are unlikely to be scrutinized or second-guessed, 
unless a case of insider dealing, fraud, or excessive fees were to arise. 
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158 For the Charitable Trust Division generally, see http://ag.ca.gov/charities/index.php (last visited July
 31, 2008). See also Columbia Law School Charities Project of  the State Attorneys General,
  http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/ag/CharitiesProj, which seeks to provide a resource
  to attorneys general in fulfi lling their enforcement responsibilities over charitable institutions.
However, an inquiry by the Attorney General into a foundation’s activities 
will not necessarily result in an enforcement action. If the foundation 
satisfi es the Attorney General’s offi ce that its activities are legitimate, or 
if it takes actions to redress any illegitimate activity, the issue may never 
be reported publicly. Even in the case of an enforcement action, a public 
report — such as a judicial decision — may not be issued. As a result, 
the issuance of opinions does not fully refl ect the priorities of an attorney 
general. On the whole, however, we conclude that California foundations 
have broad latitude under the law and in practice within which they may 
choose to engage in mission investing.
In a pioneering step, California has recognized that non-judicial decisions 
offer valuable guidance to charitable institutions, and is in the process of 
posting on its website summaries of non-judicial decisions by the offi ce on 
a no-names basis.158 Given the authority the Attorney General has over 
local charities, the additional transparency this information may provide 
promises to advance legal clarity for foundations seeking to interpret 
California fi duciary standards, as well as to provide practical guidance to 
foundations regarding the Attorney General’s enforcement priorities. 
Appendix F
Case Study: New York
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159 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (hereinafter “NY NPCL”) §§ 102(a) (defi nitions), 512 (granting
 broad investment authority to an organization’s governing board), 513 (describing the
 administration of  assets received for specifi c purposes), 514 (granting authority to delegate
 investment duties), 522 (providing less stringent standards for release of  restrictions on use or 
 investment of  gifts), & 717 (setting the board’s standard of  care as that which “ordinarily prudent 
 men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions”). 
160 Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S. 2d 575, 593 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
161 NY NPCL § 513(b). 
162 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW (hereinafter “NY EPTL”) § 11-2.3.
163 Proposed Prudent Investor Act in N.Y., EPTL-SCPA LEG. ADVISORY COMM., THIRD REPORT 16
 (Mar. 22, 1993), available at http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocm31960368.htm. 
I. Introduction
 
Private foundations organized under New York state law are controlled 
either by the state’s Not-for-Profi t Corporation Law or its Estates, 
Powers, and Trusts Law. If a New York private foundation is organized 
as a corporation, its investment authority is governed by the New 
York Management of Institutional Funds Act, an amplifi ed version of 
UMIFA.159 An overlying duty of obedience binding a charity’s directors 
to the purposes and goals of the organization informs the law: “Unlike 
business corporations, whose ultimate objective is to make money, 
nonprofi t corporations are defi ned by their specifi c objectives: perpetuation 
of particular activities are [sic] central to the raison d’être of the 
organization.”160 A donor’s intent will trump a provision of the statute, in 
the case of inconsistency.161 
If a New York private foundation is organized as a trust, its investment 
authority is governed by the New York Prudent Investor Act.162 The 
statute articulates the duties of the modern trustee when investing 
institutional funds. As summarized by the sponsoring legislative 
committee: 
[The modern prudent investor] looks for total return; he is not 
especially concerned about the difference between principal and 
income... he is investing both for current and long-term benefi t. 
He sees the portfolio as a whole and diversifi es investments to limit 
specifi c risks. He assesses the acceptable risk and seeks to maximize 
return at that risk level. He hires professional help where needed.163 
New York trust law imposes a duty of obedience on a trustee. Accordingly, 
a trustee must administer the trust strictly in compliance with the terms of 
the trust as set out by the settlor.
II.  UPMIFA 
UPMIFA has not been enacted in New York, nor has it been introduced 
to the legislature.164 No public discussions have been held concerning 
its enactment, short of consideration by the Non-Profi t Organizations 
Committee of the New York City Bar Association. That committee 
endorsed UPMIFA while suggesting the major change that UPMIFA apply 
only to new foundations, and not retroactively to existing ones.165 
III.  UMIFA
UMIFA is incorporated into several provisions of N.Y. Not-for-Profi t 
Corporation Law. In 1978, the legislature passed the “New York 
Management of Institutional Funds Act.”166 Directors and offi cers of 
nonprofi t corporations must exercise “good faith and…that degree of 
diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise 
under similar circumstances in like positions.”167 While it is the business 
judgment rule that applies to New York nonprofi t corporations, the law 
relies on a prudence standard in elaborating on that rule.
Consistent with UMIFA, New York law requires that fi duciaries of an 
endowment fund maintain the historical dollar value of the assets.168 
164 Uniform Law Commission, UPMIFA, Enactment Status Map, 
 http://www.upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=68 (last visited September 21, 2008).
165 Letter from David G. Samuels, Chair, N.Y.C. Bar Assoc., Committee on Non-Profi t Orgs., to
 Mr. Hawkins, Drafting Committee of  UPMIFA (Aug. 10, 2007), available at 
 http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Charitable_organizations.pdf.
166 NY NPCL §§ 102, 513, & 717.
167 NY NPCL § 717. 
168 NY NPCL §§ 513(c), 717. 
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IV.  UPIA
 
UPIA is substantially included in New York’s more comprehensive 
“Prudent Investor Act.”169 New York’s legislation is intended to be “close 
in concept and spirit” to UPIA.170 The Act was approved on July 26, 
1994, and took effect January 1, 1995.171
The Act enunciates a prudent investor standard, which adopts modern 
portfolio theory, and requires a trustee to determine an overall portfolio 
strategy that is diversifi ed and meets the short- and long-term needs of 
the trust’s benefi ciaries. A trustee must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
caution, and must take into account the purposes and terms and provisions 
of the governing instrument.172 
The case law applying the New York Management of Institutional Funds 
Act or the New York Prudent Investor Act to charitable organizations 
does not elaborate or expand upon those laws codifying the investment 
decision-making authority and responsibility of managers of charitable 
assets. Existing case law involves acts of gross negligence, nonfeasance, or 
169 NY EPTL § 11-2.3. 
170 EPTL-SCPA LEG. ADVISORY COMM., THIRD REPORT § IV at 43. 
171 The Act was drafted and recommended by an Estate, Powers and Trusts Law (“EPTL”) Advisory 
 Committee created by joint resolution of  the Senate and Assembly Judiciary Committees. 
 The Act was drafted to incorporate basic principles of  the Prudent Investor Rule from
 RESTATEMENT 3D, TRUSTS, a related Illinois statute (ILLPIA), and the Uniform Prudent Investment 
 Act, which at the time was still a work in progress. The Committee’s Third Report, released in 
 March 1993, explains the Committee’s reasoning in full. See Proposed Prudent Investor Act in 
 N.Y., EPTL-SCPA LEG. ADVIS. COMM., THIRD REPORT (Mar. 22, 1993), available at 
 http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/scandoclinks/ocm31960368.htm. The purpose of  the new Prudent 
 Investment Rule was to replace the prior law of  fi duciary investment (then codifi ed as NY EPTL 
 § 11-2.2(a) & (b)(1)) and the traditional prudent man rule. Proposed Prudent Investor Act in N.Y., 
 EPTL-SCPA LEG. ADVIS. COMM., THIRD REPORT at 2, 15-16. The Act as a whole refl ects “a major 
 national trend in the law of  fi duciary investment, in response to changing economic conditions, 
 newer investment vehicles and strategies, modern investment theory and an evolving regulatory 
 environment for fi duciaries.” Id. at 2. 
172 NY EPTL § 11.2.3(b). 
acts of bad faith such as fraud and self-dealing. Nothing in the case law 
suggests that a fi duciary would be held liable for an investment decision 
made in good faith and with the requisite degree of care.173 
V.  Integration of New York and 
 Federal Tax Laws
New York has practically identical provisions in its Not-For-Profi t 
Corporation Law and its Estates, Powers and Trusts Law referring to 
private foundations.174 These sections were enacted together in 1971 to 
ensure strict conformance of New York law with federal law, including 
I.R.C. § 4944.175 Any change to the federal tax laws relating to private 
foundations would be incorporated automatically into New York state 
law. No New York case law or attorney general opinion elaborates on any 
of these requirements or specifi cally discusses jeopardy investing.176 
173 For example, in In re Janes, 90 N.Y.2d 41 (N.Y. 1997), the Court of  Appeals found a corporate
  fi duciary liable for imprudently investing an estate’s assets, part of  which was bequeathed to 
 charitable benefi ciaries. In applying the Prudent Person Rule (the earlier, more stringent version of  
 the modern Prudent Investor Rule), the Court makes clear that a fi duciary’s conduct will not be 
 judged by the success or failure of  any one investment or of  the trust overall, for mere error in 
 investment judgment, or for failure to adhere strictly to any particular investment strategy. The correct 
 focus is on the fi duciary’s decision-making procedure; liability attaches when a fi duciary fails to 
 exercise reasonable care, skill and caution. Here, liability was supported by proof  that the 
 fi duciary: (1) failed to conduct an initial formal analysis of  the estate and establish an investment 
 plan consistent with the testator’s primary objectives; (2) failed to follow its own internal procedures 
 during the administration of  the estate; (3) failed to conduct more than routine reviews of  the holdings 
 at issue or consider alternative investment choices, despite a seven-year period of  steady decline 
 in the value of  the stock; and (4) ultimately failed to diversify the estate’s large concentration of  stock, 
 letting it drop to approximately one-third of  its date-of-death value. The lower court’s opinion contains 
 a thorough explanation of  the applicable test. In re Janes, 643 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976-977 (N.Y. App. Div. 
 1996) (“While mere erroneous judgment or poor investment performance cannot be the basis of  a 
 fi nding of  imprudence, where the facts known at the time of  the decision establish its 
 unreasonableness, a fi nding of  imprudence is warranted.”).
 In another example, S.H. and Helen R. Scheuer Family Foundation, Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 
 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that a cause of  action 
 under the Not-For-Profi t Corporation Law was properly alleged by plaintiffs complaining that 
 defendants imprudently and negligently invested a foundation’s assets. Here, the complaint focused 
 not on the results of  the investment decisions but on the directors’ decision-making procedures, 
 alleging that defendant directors knowingly approved self-dealing investment acts, improperly 
 withheld information from the other directors, and engaged in bribery and coercion in order to cover 
 up such wrongdoing. 
174 NY NPCL § 406; NY EPTL § 8.18. 
175 See In re Hammer, 362 N.Y.S.2d 753, 759 (N.Y.Sur. 1974). See also NY EPTL § 8:8.1 commentary 
 (McKinney 2002) (stating that the purpose of  this section was to incorporate the restrictions 
 imposed by the 1969 Tax Reform Act into current and future NY trusts), Memorandum of  Joint 
 Legislative Committee to Study Revision of  Corporation Law on Private Foundations, Distribution 
 of  Taxable Income, NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 136 (1971). 
176 See discussion supra Part I.B.7.e.
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VI.  Practice Notes
The New York State Attorney General’s offi ce is responsible for overseeing 
the administration of private foundations’ charitable assets, representing 
the interests of benefi ciaries of charitable dispositions, and enforcing the 
applicable governing law that includes the common law duties of care, 
loyalty, and obedience.177 The Attorney General has broad statutory 
authority to prosecute and defend legal actions to protect the interests 
of New York and the public.178 
The New York Attorney General’s Offi ce has issued no formal or informal 
opinions that interpret the standards for the investment of foundation 
assets.179 Concern for ensuring the diversifi cation of charitable portfolios has 
been expressed by the AG, but short of self-dealing or fraud, the AG’s offi ce 
has not indicated an inclination to intervene in the management of charitable 
assets. We conclude from this that New York foundations in law and in 
practice have broad latitude to invest in accordance with their mission.
 
177 N.Y.S. Att’y Gen. Charities Bureau, THE REGULATORY ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
 CHARITIES BUREAU 3-4 (2003), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/charities/role.pdf. 
178 Id. 
179 For opinions issued by the New York Attorney General’s Offi ce, see 
 http://www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/indexsub.html (last visited July 31, 2008). 
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180 OR. REV. STAT. Ch. 65.
181 OR. REV. STAT. Ch. 130 (UNIFORM TRUST CODE).
182 OR. REV. STAT. § 65.357(1) (prescribing that a director shall discharge his or her duties in
 good faith, with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise in similar 
 circumstances, and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of  the 
 corporation)(emphasis added). 
183 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.650-130.680. 
184 The UNIFORM TRUST CODE was adopted by the NCCUSL in August 2004 and was last revised or
 amended in 2005.
185 OR. REV. STAT. § 130.650.
186 OR. REV. STAT. § 130.750(2).
187 H.B. 2905, 74th Leg. Ass., 2007 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), was signed by the governor on June 22,
  2007 and chaptered No. 554 of  July 11, 2007. The statute is set out at OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
 128.305-128.336.
188 OR. REV. STAT. § 128.322(4)(b).
I. Introduction
 
Private foundations in Oregon are established as either nonprofi t 
corporations or as trusts, and are governed accordingly by either the 
Oregon Non-Profi t Corporation Law180 or Oregon trust law.181 Both 
bodies of law set out standards of care, loyalty and prudence incumbent 
upon a foundation’s directors182 or trustees183 in managing and investing 
assets. Oregon trust law, which is based on the Uniform Trust Code,184 
requires a trustee to administer a trust in accordance with the settlor’s 
express intent.185 The prudent investor rule as expressed in UPIA and 
adopted by the Oregon legislature states affi rmatively that it is to be 
construed as a default rule that may be “expanded, restricted, eliminated 
or otherwise altered by the provisions of a trust.”186
II.  UPMIFA
UPMIFA entered into force in Oregon on January 1, 2008,187 and thereby 
repealed and replaced UMIFA. 
 
The Oregon legislature chose to include the optional provision concerning 
a rebuttable presumption of imprudence should an endowment’s payout 
exceed seven percent.188 The Attorney General’s Charitable Activities 
section successfully expressed its view that UPMIFA’s shift away from 
preserving the historic dollar value of a foundation’s endowment in favor 
of preserving its purchasing power would be acceptable so long as a 
benchmark were established as a precaution. Otherwise, the uniform act 
was adopted without substantive alteration.189
As discussed above, UPMIFA seeks to harmonize the standards of 
prudence, duty, and care incumbent on the management of all charitable 
funds, regardless of their corporate form. UPMIFA defers to donor intent, 
and as a result, careful drafting of a charitable organization’s constitutive 
documents will overcome any provisions of the statute to which a donor 
does not wish her foundation to be subject.190
III.  UMIFA
UMIFA was enacted by the Oregon legislature in 1972 without material 
alteration from the uniform act.191 While it has been replaced and repealed 
by UPMIFA as of January 1, 2008, it provided guidance regarding the 
investment of Oregon endowment assets for almost thirty-six years. The 
key provisions concerning prudent investment, standard of duty and 
care applied in Oregon until UPMIFA entered into force. No cases were 
litigated in Oregon under UMIFA. 
IV.  Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
UPIA was enacted in Oregon in 1995, and adopts the uniform act in its 
entirety.192 UPIA displaced the older “prudent man” standard, bringing 
Oregon trust law into line with modern investment practices by embracing 
a total portfolio approach, rather than determining the risk/return profi le 
of individual investments. 
189 Oregon includes funds managed or moneys held for investment by the state treasurer in the
 defi nition of  “institutional funds” subject to the provisions of  UPMIFA. OR. REV. STAT. 
 § 128.316(5)(d). In addition, Oregon subjects gifts from private donors to a public body 
 or any instrumentality of  a public body to UPMIFA’s reach. OR. REV. STAT. § 128.328(5). 
190 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.310-128.355 (repealed). 
191 Oregon has limited case law in general, and the area of  nonprofi t corporations and charitable
 trusts is no exception.
192 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 130.750-775 (formerly OR. REV. STAT. §§ 128.192-128.218).
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No legislative history or case law exists that would provide guidance or 
insight into the Oregon legislature’s or judiciary’s interpretation of UPIA.
V.  Integration of Oregon and Federal Tax Laws
Oregon’s Non-Profi t Corporation Law provides that a nonprofi t corporation 
that is deemed to be a private foundation under the defi nition of the I.R.C. shall 
be subject under Oregon law to the tax regulations of the I.R.C. applicable to 
private foundations.193 This includes § 4944 containing the prohibition against 
jeopardizing investments and the exception for program-related investments.194 
Similarly, private foundations organized as trusts are subject to the Code’s 
regulations, including the jeopardy investment prohibition and its program-related 
investment exception.195 
 
As a result, any changes made to the I.R.C. would be incorporated into Oregon law.
VI.  Practice notes
The Attorney General’s Charitable Activities section has not to date had 
signifi cant enforcement actions regarding the investment activity of charitable 
organizations. No guidance from the Attorney General’s Offi ce interprets the 
relevant laws of investing the assets of a charitable organization, including a 
private foundation organized as a nonprofi t corporation or a trust.196
As in California and New York, we conclude that this indicates that Oregon 
foundations enjoy broad latitude both in law and practice to manage their 
investments in accordance with their charitable purposes.
193 OR. REV. STAT. § 65.036.
194 OR. REV. STAT. § 65.036(4).
195 OR. REV. STAT. § 128.085.
196 The Oregon Attorney General’s opinions may be found at http://www.doj.state.or.us/agoffi ce/.
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I. Statement of Fiduciary Responsibility
 
We recognize that our fi duciary responsibility requires that we maximize 
return, minimize risk, and consider the impact of our investments on 
advancing the philanthropic goals of the foundation. Consistent with 
the Foundation’s mission to [SPECIFIC FOUNDATION’S MISSION] 
we seek, where possible, to invest our endowment assets in companies 
that [SPECIFIC GOALS] advance this mission, and we seek to avoid 
investing in companies that contribute to the very issues the foundation’s 
grantmaking seeks to address.
II. Spending and Investment Goals
In general, the Foundation seeks to generate income and capital gains 
necessary to support its operations and fund its grantmaking [over the 
long term/for a specifi ed number of years if spending down endowment is 
desired], as follows: 
 • to provide capital directly to or own the equity or debt of
  enterprises that further the foundation’s mission 
 • to avoid investing in companies whose impacts contribute to the  
  problems that the foundation’s grantmaking seeks to address 
 • to set spending levels based primarily on an assessment of current  
  need and of current and projected investment returns 
 • [if perpetual endowment is desired: to preserve, to the extent
  possible consistent with the foundation’s spending levels, the real
   (infl ation-adjusted) value of its assets over the long term]. 
 
Primary Return Objective and Risk Tolerance 
The primary return objective is to maintain or increase the purchasing power 
of the Foundation’s portfolio in order to support future grant expenditures 
and related administrative expenses, with consideration for the consistency 
of the Foundation’s investments with its charitable goals. This objective can 
be met by earning an average annual total return of [__] percent over the 
long term. This [__] percent dollar-weighted total return defi nes the Fund’s 
required return. The target rate of return is also [__] percent.
Primary Return Objective
 
 REQUIRED RATE OF RETURN   PERCENT  
          
 Program Grants  
 Program Administration Expenses   
 Investment Management Expenses*   
 Excise Taxes   
 Payout        
  
 Real Growth of Assets   
 Reinvestment (adjustment) for Infl ation   
 Required Arithmetic Return      
 Volatility Adjustment (Monte-Carlo)   
    
 Total Required Rate of Return (ROR)   
 *Using an Index Strategy   
Spending Policy (Payout)
At each year-end meeting the Board will set a target amount for grants to 
be made during the ensuing year. This Investment Policy Statement is based 
upon the Foundation’s current spending policy (and fi ve-year trailing spending 
policy) set at approximately [at least 5] percent of the current value of the 
Foundation’s portfolio. Should the spending policy be permanently adjusted 
up or down, this Investment Policy Statement should be revised.
In order to achieve the primary return objective, the Board is comfortable 
with a risk level of the portfolio that is similar to the volatility (standard 
deviation) and drawdown characteristics of [the broad U.S. equity market 
(Wilshire 5000 index) at 100 percent] of the volatility of such a market. 
“Risk” includes both the risk of not attaining the primary return objective 
over several years, as well as the risk of loss of capital.
The Board believes a well-diversifi ed portfolio structured according to this 
Investment Policy Statement should meet or exceed the Foundation’s primary 
return objective over the long term, at an acceptable level of overall risk.
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Given the Foundation’s very low tax rate, there is no preference as 
between sources of income (capital gain or ordinary income), therefore, 
the Fund will utilize a total return approach in pursuing the objectives. In 
other words, the portfolio structure does not target a specifi c income level; 
rather the return objective is expected to be achieved through both capital 
appreciation and current income. Hence, the Foundation will meet the 
cash fl ow needs using either income or principal or both.
Investment Guidelines
The Foundation’s assets will be managed by professional money managers 
that are selected by the Investment Committee. Assets are allocated in 
accordance with guidelines set forth by the Investment Committee and 
approved by the Board. Investment managers have discretion to manage 
the assets in each particular portfolio to best achieve investment objectives 
and requirements consistent with the social and fi nancial guidelines set 
forth in the Foundation’s Investment Policy Statement. Managers will be 
monitored on a quarterly basis. 
Asset Allocation
Assets will be diversifi ed both by asset class (domestic equities, foreign 
equities, fi xed income, venture capital, private placements and real estate) 
and within each asset class. 
Foreign debt and equity securities may include an allocation to emerging 
market countries. Emerging market securities are defi ned as those included 
in the MSCI EEM Index for equities, and the JPMorgan EMBI Index for 
bonds. The emerging market allocation may be accomplished via the hiring 
of managers specializing in emerging markets investing or through an 
allocation within broad foreign portfolios. Emerging market debt securities 
should not exceed [__] percent of the market value of total foreign debt 
securities. Emerging market equity securities should not exceed [__] percent 
of the market value of total emerging market equity securities. 
Asset allocation will fall within the following ranges: 
Equities: [percentage range]
 U.S. Large Cap
 U.S. Small Cap
 International 
  Developed Markets
  Emerging Markets
 
Fixed Income: [percentage range] 
 Domestic
 International
  Developed Markets
  Emerging Markets
  
Alternative Investments: [percentage range]
 Private equity
 Hedge funds
 Real estate
 Timber
 Other 
Screening
The Foundation views its investments as an integrated component of its 
overall mission. Investments are based on sound, professional fi nancial 
analysis and fi ltered through screens consistent with and in support of the 
Foundation’s values and mission. Exclusionary screens guide managers 
on companies to avoid, and inclusionary screens guide managers on 
companies in which to invest. 
Screening will be conducted as follows: 
Exclusionary Screens: 
 [Tailored to individual foundation’s programmatic interests]
Inclusionary Screens: 
 [Tailored to individual foundation’s programmatic interests]
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Proxy Voting Guidelines
The Foundation asks each of our managers, as well as our responsible 
investing service providers, to inform us of shareholder resolutions being 
considered with corporations in which we hold stock. 
The Foundation votes its proxies as follows: 
 • When program interests are directly involved, proxies are voted in 
  a manner consistent with them. 
 • When a shareholder resolution deals with a social or   
  environmental issue that is not directly related to the Foundation’s
  program interests, the Foundation will review each individual
  case and consult with our grantees, managers and others, as
  appropriate. 
Monitoring
The Investment Committee will monitor the performance of the 
Foundation’s managers on a quarterly basis. 
Performance Standards
The benchmarks against which the Foundation’s long-term investment 
performance is measured are set out below. For total Foundation assets 
and for each asset class a peer group universe benchmark and market 
index benchmark has been established. It is expected that the aggregate 
fund and the individual managers will meet or exceed these performance 
standards on the following bases: 
 • Absolute returns should exceed both benchmarks on a three- and  
  fi ve-year rolling basis 
 • Risk, as measured by the annualized standard deviation of
  quarterly returns, should be less than that of the market index
  over the same three- and fi ve-year rolling periods. Higher
  volatility is acceptable if the risk-adjusted return, as measured 
  by the Sharpe ratio, is greater than that of the market index.
The peer group manager universe benchmarks are to be composed of 
professionally managed institutional managers for the Foundation’s 
separate and collective account managers and mutual funds for the 
Foundation’s mutual fund managers. The market index benchmarks were 
established in light of the Foundation’s fi nancial objectives and long-term 
expectations for the capital markets and infl ation. 
Benchmarks
  
Manager Review and Termination 
Investment funds may be placed on “watch” status, replaced or terminated 
whenever the Investment Committee loses confi dence in the management of 
the fund, when the characteristics of the fund are no longer consistent with 
the fund’s intended role, or the current style is no longer deemed appropriate. 
 
Asset Peer Group Universe Market Index
Total Foundation Endowment/Foundation Universe
Fixed Income
Domestic Equity:
Large Cap 
Small Cap 
International Equity
Alternative Investments
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